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ABSTRACT 
 Does Russia’s use of social media influence the American public discourse on 
nuclear weapons? Russia is influencing the American public discourse and is using an 
active long-term media strategy to complement and support its nuclear policy objectives. 
However, the discourse is mostly reactive and ranges from positive and negative 
discourse about Russia’s strategic nuclear weapons. This research does not find that 
Russian media is successfully influencing and persuading U.S. audiences to believe 
Russian content. However, the discourse does present opportunity for political action and 
change in U.S. policy. This research is focused on Twitter discourse, while considering 
the reaction from U.S. media and reactive policy statements of the United States. The 
lack of Internet and online advertising regulations enables deliberate targeting of 
audiences on the topic of nuclear weapons, specifically to garner support for the Russian 
government’s narrative. The suspension of the intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty, 
Russia’s development of new strategic weapons, and increased media communications 
between the United States and Russia are reminiscent of the early 1980s “War Scare” and 
provide a framework for understanding Russia’s methods today. The research is 
conducted with qualitative and quantitative methods, with primary and secondary 
research, and provides historical background, framing of media, social network analysis, 
and application to information strategy. 
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These weapons are unique, and a large part of their uniqueness derives from 
their being perceived as unique. 
 —Thomas C. Schelling1 
More than 25 years after Dr. John Arquilla and his colleague David Ronfeldt wrote 
about “netwar,” warning of the need to prepare for the future soon to become a reality,2 
the Russians are now weaponizing the internet including through the surveillance of U.S. 
infrastructure, through collecting data, through the targeting of mass audiences while 
sowing confusion and distrust between government officials and constituents, and through 
the hacking of election and voting systems.3 Netwar has become a reality. 
Unsurprisingly, former-Soviet territories and neighbors are either already dealing 
with or fear future netwar aggression from Russia in one form or another.4 In 2007, oddly 
the same year Time magazine named President Vladimir Putin their “Person of the Year” 
for bringing “stability and renewed status to his country” and prior to Russia’s invasion of 
Georgia in 2008, successfully seizing an enclave, Russia-friendly hackers successfully 
conducted disruptive cyberattacks against Estonia. An Estonian government official stated 
that the attacks were “orchestrated by the Kremlin, and malicious gangs then seized the 
opportunity to join in and do their own bit to attack Estonia.”5 In 2014, Russia then invaded 
Ukraine, engaging in a protracted war there that continues today with Russian Special 
Forces (RSF), colloquially called “little green men,” continually undermining the 
                                                 
1 Thomas C. Schelling, “An Astonishing Sixty Years: The Legacy of Hiroshima,” (Prize Lecture, 
Beijersalen, The Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences, Stockholm, December 8, 2005), 
https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/economic-sciences/2005/schelling/lecture/. 
2 John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, Cyberwar Is Coming!, RP-223 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 
1993), https://www.rand.org/pubs/reprints/RP223.html. 
3 John Arquilla, “Cyber War Is Already Upon Us,” Foreign Policy, February 27, 2012, 
https://foreignpolicy.com/2012/02/27/cyberwar-is-already-upon-us/. 
4 Arquilla. 
5 Damien McGuinness, “How a Cyber Attack Transformed Estonia,” BBC, September 5, 2018, 
https://www.bbc.com/news/39655415. 
2 
Ukrainian government.6 Thus far, Russia’s successes in aggression have apparently been 
orchestrated in a comprehensive strategy, including using cyber warfare to surveil, disable, 
falsify, and mask conventional force entry. 
In the age of social media and internet, President Putin has created an empire that 
is challenging political stability and causing fear in the West and throughout Eastern 
European states. Russia’s ability to use every available tool in information warfare suggests 
a potential for use in nuclear strategy against the West. A possible attempt of Russia’s use 
of nuclear-weapons-related communication deception in social media occurred in 2016; 
during a coup attempt against President Erdogan, Russia’s state-owned Sputnik and RT 
falsely reported the existence of a large-scale operation of armed police at Incirlik Air Base 
in Turkey while also declaring the locations of U.S. nuclear weapons within the same area.7 
This use of media deception is only one example that suggests a comprehensive Russian 
strategy. Audiences, particularly active and attentive citizens, are often influenced by 
media content, which can shape public discourse, cause protests and petitions, and 
influence voting and national policy toward nuclear reduction.8  
While disinformation from Russia is not new, the ability with which it can be spread 
is growing. Throughout the history of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and 
the Russian Federation (RF), regime leaders have used state-owned media as a tool to sow 
discontent, to spread misinformation, and to boast about their nuclear weapons programs.9 
However, little research and analysis exists beyond the utility of “nuclear saber-rattling” 
                                                 
6 Richard Stengel, “Person of the Year 2007, Choosing Order Over Freedom,” Time, December 19, 
2007, http://content.time.com/time/specials/2007/personoftheyear/article/
0,28804,1690753_1690757,00.html. 
7 Andrew Weisburd, Clint Watts, and JM Berger, “Trolling for Trump: How Russia Is Trying to 
Destroy Our Democracy,” War on the Rocks, November 6, 2016, https://warontherocks.com/2016/11/
trolling-for-trump-how-russia-is-trying-to-destroy-our-democracy/. 
8 Jeffrey W. Knopf, Domestic Society and International Cooperation: The Impact of Protest on U.S. 
Arms Control Policy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 60. 
9 Ivan Zasurskiĭ, Media and Power in Post-Soviet Russia, (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2004). A key 
question during the War Scare is revealed in declassified documents when Ronald Reagan asks, “Do you 
think Soviet leaders really fear us, or is all the huffing and puffing just part of their propaganda?, quoted in 
Nate Jones, “The 1983 War Scare: ‘The Last Paroxysm’ of the Cold War Part I,” National Security 
Archive, May 16, 2013, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB426/.  
3 
and public posturing statements regarding the RF’s use of information operations in 
attempts to shape strategic nuclear weapons policy in the United States. This research 
provides insight into the Russian regime’s efforts to use social media, specifically Twitter, 
to influence U.S. audiences. Russia actively seeks to influence U.S. audiences through 
social media content, further dividing already polarized nuclear weapons advocacy groups, 
and inciting fear of nuclear war. Whether it works is, to some extent, the larger question 
behind this research. 
A. RESEARCH QUESTION  
Does Russia’s use of social media influence the American public discourse on 
nuclear weapons? 
B. BACKGROUND: UNDERSTANDING STRATEGIC WEAPONS 
Why does weapons discourse matter? Strategic weapons and other military 
technologies are prevalent within the Western news. Specifically, in the context of nuclear 
weapons, strategic weapons10 are those that can destroy an adversary’s strategic assets 
(economy, national political institutions, military) and are considered a tool in international 
politics and in maintaining security interests and in use for deterrence or coercion against 
adversarial nation-states. The RF has various types of strategic weapons, both nuclear and 
non-nuclear. Russia’s state-owned media regularly publishes articles, videos, testimony, 
and related material about Russia’s strategic weapons and new military technologies. 
Whether Kalashnikov’s automated weapons system designed to make shoot/no shoot 
decisions,11 armed demonstrations of the Final Experimental Demonstration Object 
Research (FEDOR) robot,12 intercontinental ballistic missiles, or the Status-6, the Russian 
                                                 
10 The definition of strategic weapons varies among different political scientists and security 
strategists, but the scope of use is always in terms as a major weapon within national-level strategy and 
requiring a decision of use by the president. 
11 Kyle Mizokami, “Kalashnikov Will Make an A.I.-Powered Killer Robot,” Popular Mechanics, July 
19, 2017, https://www.popularmechanics.com/military/weapons/news/a27393/kalashnikov-to-make-ai-
directed-machine-guns/. 




government and media is apparently weaponizing media to showcase Russia’s military 
capabilities and project a technical edge over the West. Also, the Kalibr missile, a different 
yet important Russian strategic weapon, is a cruise missile that is launchable from ships 
and submarines.13 Both the out-of-compliance 9M729 missile and the Status-6, an 
autonomous nuclear torpedo bomb also an Ocean Multipurpose System, are regularly 
included within the narratives of Russian media.14 
Some of today’s strategic nuclear weapons may likely be autonomous, at least to 
some degree, and Russia’s media representation reflects the state’s dual emphasis of 
autonomy and nuclear weaponization.15 Additionally, strategic weapons are a focal topic 
at the highest international policy levels, specifically at the United Nations, within which 
the United States, the United Kingdom, the RF, and others are in a tumultuous cycle of tit-
for-tat public media strategic communications. The strategic weapons focused on in this 
research include the Status-6—also named Poseidon and Kanyon and shown in Figure 2—
and the 9M729. The 9M729, also known by NATO as the SSC-8, is a Russian cruise 
missile that U.S. authorities say violates the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) 
Treaty.16  
The INF treaty was originally with the USSR, but was extended to Russia after the 
dissolution.17 According to the U.S. Department of State, the INF Treaty 
                                                 
13 “Russia Upgrades Kalibr Cruise Missiles,” Jane’s 360, September 25, 2019, 
https://www.janes.com/article/91514/russia-upgrades-kalibr-cruise-missiles. 
14“Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD): Status-6 / Kanyon - Ocean Multipurpose System - Russian 
and Soviet Nuclear Forces,”  GlobalSecurity.org, November 21, 2018, https://www.globalsecurity.org/
wmd/world/russia/status-6.htm. 
15 “Russia Lays Groundwork for Self-Learning Artificial Intelligence Weapons,” TASS, June 6, 2018, 
https://tass.com/defense/1008270; “Russia Prepares for a Future of Making Autonomous Weapons, “ 
c4isrnet, June 11, 2018, https://www.c4isrnet.com/electronic-warfare/2018/06/11/russia-prepares-for-a-
future-of-making-autonomous-weapons/; Amy F. Woolf, Russia’s Nuclear Weapons: Doctrine, Forces, 
and Modernization, CRS Report No. R45861 (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, August 
5, 2019), 41, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R45861.pdf. 
16 “Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD): 9M729—SSC-X-8,” GlobalSecurity.org, accessed June 
13, 2019, https://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/russia/ssc-8.htm. 
17 “Treaty between The United States of America and The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the 
Elimination of their Intermediate-range and Shorter-range Missiles (INF Treaty),” conclusion date: 
December 8, 1987, U.S. Department of State, https://2009-2017.state.gov/t/avc/trty/102360.htm. 
5 
requires destruction of the Parties’ ground-launched ballistic and cruise 
missiles with ranges of between 500 and 5,500 kilometers, their launchers 
and associated support structures and support equipment within three years 
after the Treaty enters into force.18 
The Status-6 is declared in media to be an autonomous 100-to-200 megaton nuclear 
hydrogen cobalt torpedo bomb that can be released from a submarine.19 The media reports 
that this bomb could destroy the entire Eastern coast of the United States or Europe and 
then cause a tsunami wave, wreaking further destruction. Russian media-released images, 
supposedly accidentally-released, of the Status-6 first occurred on November 10, 2015.20 
Since then, the size and number of torpedoes have increased, and media has shifted from 
deceptive release to an open dissemination of information about the weapon. Although the 
most recent U.S. Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) acknowledges the existence of an 
autonomous nuclear torpedo,21 this thesis does not aim to assess the accuracy of reporting 
or capabilities of the weapon. Instead, this study aims to determine to what extent these 
weapons and similar weapons being featured in social media represents Russia’s attempts 
to sway strategic policy by influencing audiences such as policymakers, national-level 
leaders, scholars, European partners, and “useful idiots” who can spread viral content. The 
former Soviet government and today’s Russian government used, and still use, deception 
and active measures via media platforms to achieve political objectives.22  
                                                 
18 U.S. Department of State. 
19 Russian media releases on its size and number of torpedoes have varied over the past four years; in 
early releases it was reported as 100 megatons while more recently as 200 megaton and later with an 
arsenal of over 30 torpedo missiles. 
20 Jeffrey Lewis, “Putin’s Doomsday Machine,” Foreign Policy, November 12, 2015, 
https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/11/12/putins-doomsday-machine-nuclear-weapon-us-russia/; The National 
Interest is often a forum for Russian ideologues, scholars, and politicians that often publish pro-Russian 
content; Sebastien Roblin, “We Now Know Why Russia Wants a 100-Megaton Nuclear Torpedo,” The 
National Interest, March 2, 2018, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/we-now-know-why-russia-
wants-100-megaton-nuclear-torpedo-24736. 
21 U.S. Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review, February 2018 (Arlington, VA: Department 
of Defense, February 2018), https://media.defense.gov/2018/Feb/02/2001872886/-1/-1/1/2018-NUCLEAR-
POSTURE-REVIEW-FINAL-REPORT.PDF. 
22 Todd C. Helmus et al., Russian Social Media Influence: Understanding Russian Propaganda in 
Eastern Europe, RR-2237-OSD (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2018), https://doi.org/10.7249/RR2237. 
6 
C. METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
The thesis uses a mixed-method approach, including qualitative heuristics in 
consideration of quantitative data supported by social network analysis, to determine the 
correlation between Russia’s social media content and attempts to influence American 
nuclear discourse. The thesis considers those findings in the context of historical Russian 
Federation and Soviet methods of media influence, social movement to explore a potential 
information strategy including but not limited to deception, influence, and informational 
deterrence and coercion. Recognizing the value of history to inform present conditions, the 
thesis begins by examining the “War Scare” between the Soviet Union and the United 
States during the 1980s for comparison and contrast of strategic dialogue, policy, media, 
and public opinion. 
This thesis then conducts three types of analysis: 1) framing of the Russian 
Federation’s media and marketing content aimed at understanding the narrative via Twitter 
during key national-level policy declarations on strategic nuclear weapons; 2) social 
network analysis of the current top actors engaging in nuclear strategic weapons discussion 
on Twitter; and 3) theoretical application of information strategy.  
The thesis analyzes open source Russian media—especially RT, Sputnik, and TASS 
and the Twitter dissemination of this media in both English and Russian—focused the 
observation on nuclear weapons-related hashtags and posts in both Russian and English. 
Table 1 shows the dates and events of research focus. 
  
7 
Table 1. Events and corresponding dates relative to Nuclear Security 
Strategy actions23 
Date Event 
10 November 2015 RT releases a photograph of the Status-6 nuclear torpedo, yet 
claims the release was by accident. 
01 December 2015 The U.S. announces RF’s violation of the Intermediate Nuclear 
Forces (INF) Treaty with the 9M729 missile. 
27 November 2016 The U.S. declares an intelligence discovery substantiating the 
existence of Status-6. 
10-14 February 2017 The U.S. claims RF has deployed 9M729 battalions. 
29 November 2017 The U.S. confirms the existence of the 9M729. 
01 December 2017 RF declares Status-6 tests. 
08 December 2017 The U.S. Administration released a strategy to counter alleged 
Russian violations of the INF treaty. 
05 February 2018 U.S. publishes NPR. 
20 February 2018 Putin announces Russia’s hypersonic weapons in a formal 
defense conference. 
20 October 2018 President Trump announces intent to terminate the INF Treaty. 
04 December 2018 Secretary Pompeo states that the United States found Russia in 
“material breach” of the INF Treaty. 
01 March 2018 Russia gives major speech on its nuclear arsenal. 
04 January 2019 TASS releases info about Status-6’s speed. 
12 January 2019 RF/TASS announces additional Status-6 torpedoes. 
23 January 2019 The RF displays the 9M729 to foreign military attaches for the 
first time. 
01 February 2019 U.S. announces suspension from the INF if Russia does not 
comply. 
02 February 2019 Russia announced the suspension of participation in the 
agreement. 
05 February 2019 RF announces creation of ground version of Kalibr complex. 
20 February 2019 Tests of Status-6 are first time shown in media via the Rossiya 
24 TV channel. 
26 February 2019 U.S. testimony hypersonic RF weapons. 
03 March 2019 RF publicizes U.S. nuclear targets. 
26 March 2019 US Intelligence insider reports to CNBC of Status-6 concerns. 
02 August 2019 The United States formally withdraws from the INF. Russia also 
announces formal suspension within 24 hours. 
 
                                                 
23 The list of dates is derived from various websites and U.S. and Russian media announcements 
available in an open search. Additional events were retrieved from “Weapons of Mass Destruction,” 
GlobalSecurity.org, and “The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty at a Glance,” Arms Control 
Association, August 2019, https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/INFtreaty. 
8 
The boundaries imposed on data selection and time frame include Twitter and 
Russian media data, readily available as open source, during key, related Russian and U.S. 
government releases of information on the Status-6 and the 9M729 [SSC-8] between the 
years of 2014 and 2019. The thesis uses a method media analysis to determine the existing 
themes within the researched Twitter data. After content analysis to determine the diffusion 
of Russian media content and themes into U.S. media within Twitter, the thesis conducts 
social network analysis from data pulled during the first half of 2019. The research 
illuminates the existing actors who are influential in receiving and diffusing key Russian 
media within Twitter. 
Following this introduction, Chapter II explores media use during the 1980s “War 
Scare.” Chapter III illustrates media content and narrative and IV presents social network 
analysis while Chapter V delves into Russia’s information strategy, and Chapter VI 
summarizes findings and offers suggestions for future research.  
9 
II. MEDIA, THE FREEZE MOVEMENT, AND THE “WAR 
SCARE” IN THE 1980S 
The idea that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and the Russian 
Federation (RF) regime leaders would use state-owned media as a tool to sow discontent, 
spread mistruth, and boast about their nuclear weapons programs is not new to today’s 
international climate.24 Russia has long used a defensive information warfare posture25 
and various forms of globalized media to attempt to strengthen its unique cultural 
uniformity and to constrict and control its satellite populations.26 In the 1960s, the USSR 
spent more money on jamming foreign radio signals than it did on radio production.27 
Throughout the Cold War, Russia continued to struggle with cultural and social 
liberalization, evidenced by restricting foreign media, attempting to control narratives, and 
countering the U.S.-propagated narrative with Soviet state-owned media.28 While the 
history of the USSR’s propaganda use is far too broad for this thesis, in the early 1980s, 
the media fight and the negotiations took a different, and highly proliferate media turn. 
Following Chapter I’s introduction to why Russia’s efforts to weaponize information in 
today’s media climate matter so much, Chapter II offers a historical snapshot of the “War 
Scare,” a distinct period, predominantly in the early 1980s, of tit-for-tat media and political 
actions that targeted various groups within the United States to spread fear, including the 
deliberate use of national-level media to influence interstate relations between the United 
                                                 
24 Zasurskiĭ, Media and Power in Post-Soviet Russia, 3–114.; Cull et al., Nicholas Cull et al., Soviet 
Subversion, Disinformation and Propaganda: How the West Fought Against It: An Analytic History, with 
Lessons for the Present, London School of Economics and Political Science Institute of Global Affairs, 
October 2017, http://www.lse.ac.uk/iga/assets/documents/arena/2018/Jigsaw-Soviet-Subversion-
Disinformation-and-Propaganda-Final-Report.pdf. 1–81.; A key question during the War Scare is revealed 
in declassified documents when Ronald Reagan asks, “Do you think Soviet leaders really fear us, or is all 
the huffing and puffing just part of their propaganda?, quoted in Jones, “The 1983 War Scare.”  
25 John Arquilla, The Reagan Imprint: Ideas in American Foreign Policy from the Collapse of 
Communism to the War on Terror (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2006), 149. 
26 Kristin Roth-Ey, Moscow Prime Time: How the Soviet Union Built the Media Empire that Lost the 
Cultural Cold War, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2014).  
27 Roth-Ey, Moscow Prime Time, 131–133. 
28 Alvin A. Snyder, Warriors of Disinformation: How Lies, Videotape, and the USIA Won the Cold 
War (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2012), 17. 
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States and the Soviet Union, while at the height of war tensions between both countries. 
Chapter II explores aspects of Russia’s “War Scare” strategic communication and strategy, 
including media and information warfare. It does so, first, by reviewing the Soviet Komitet 
Gosudarstvennoi Bezopasnosti’s (KGB) increasing influence in Russia’s leadership in the 
1970s, then by describing how disinformation influenced world events including the 
discussion of capitalism versus communism and how the USSR used the freeze movement 
and, finally, by briefly looking at how non-state media, President Ronald Reagan’s 
communications, and the INF may have influenced today’s efforts.  
A. BACKGROUND: KGB INFLUENCE ON MEDIA 
During the 1970s, the KGB’s influence spurred USSR advancement of 
synchronized and executed information and political warfare, with Yuri Andropov, a 
former KGB chief wholly admired by President Putin,29 as a critical actor. Not only an 
USSR intelligence service but also, functionally, a policing security service,30 the KGB 
likely influenced Andropov’s methods of population control, including its media efforts. 
Andropov became General Secretary of the Communist Party in 1982, the first time a KGB 
chief became head of the party;31 under his political influence, intelligence and information 
operations, known as active measures, became inseparable and highly effective.32 
Andropov encouraged propaganda, including attempts to delegitimize the United States33 
and also attempted to hide, with propaganda, his illnesses from the public.34 After 
Andropov’s death, Konstantin Chernenko took over as head of the state and party, but his 
declining health soon resulted in inactivity of the Kremlin’s affairs.35 However, in 1984, 
                                                 
29 Robert W. Pringle, “Putin: The New Andropov?,” International Journal of Intelligence and 
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30 Cull et al., Soviet Subversion, Disinformation and Propaganda. 
31 Cull et al. 
32 Cull et al. 
33 Cull et al. 
34 Don Oberdorfer, From the Cold War to a New Era: The United States and the Soviet Union, 1983–
1991, Updated ed. (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), 79. 
35 Oberdorfer, 84. 
11 
the Kremlin publicized upcoming talks with President Ronald Reagan, describing their 
purpose as aimed at preventing “the militarization of outer space,” highlighting a deliberate 
use of media in the Soviets’ nuclear strategy for thwarting President Reagan’s “Star Wars” 
defensive strategy, also known as the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI).36 
B. THE “WAR SCARE” 
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, political tensions escalated, challenging Soviet 
political leaders in negotiations and in efforts to leverage media. Parallel to the USSR’s 
media and influence efforts during these two decades, U.S. leaders conducted negotiations 
with USSR leaders regarding nonproliferation, limitation of nuclear weapons, and building 
and challenging global geopolitical ties and other relationships. Negotiations found some 
success. In the 1970s, the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) and the Anti-Ballistic 
Missile Treaty (ABM) marked major areas of cooperation. Hostilities between opposing 
alliances of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War created major new tensions, but these eventually 
abated, and the United States and USSR renewed overt cooperation by signing SALT II in 
1979. Inadequacies of the SALT treaties eventually led to the U.S.-Soviet Strategic Arms 
Reduction Treaty (START) I during the 1990s.37 
Also during the 1970s and 1980s, however, other events including the end of the 
Vietnam War;38 the Angola Crisis;39 the political revolution and hostage crisis in Iran;40 
the USSR’s invasion of Afghanistan;41 and hostilities in the Horn of Africa and South 
                                                 
36 Oberdorfer, 84. 
37 “Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on 
Strategic Offensive Reductions (START I),” conclusion date: July 31, 1991, Nuclear Threat Initiative, 
https://www.nti.org/learn/treaties-and-regimes/treaties-between-united-states-america-and-union-soviet-
socialist-republics-strategic-offensive-reductions-start-i-start-ii/. 
38 “Ending the Vietnam War, 1969–1973,” U.S. Department of State, accessed April 20, 2019, 
https://history.state.gov/milestones/1969-1976/ending-vietnam. 
39 “The Angola Crisis 1974–75,” U.S. Department of State, accessed April 20, 2019, 
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40 Suzanne Maloney and Keian Razipour,”The Iranian Revolution—A Timeline of Events,” 
Brookings, January 24, 2019, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2019/01/24/the-iranian-
revolution-a-timeline-of-events/. 
41 “U.S.-Russia Nuclear Arms Control,” Council On Foreign Relations, accessed April 16, 2019, 
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America created other tensions.42 The tensions became enough that the countries actually 
each boycotted the Olympics once in the early 1980s, first the United States then the Soviet 
Union.43 
In the early 1980s, to reduce the risk posed by Soviet influence, the “Active 
Measures Working Group” (AMWG), a group of U.S. interagency volunteers, exposed 
Soviet disinformation in the media44 while the United States Information Agency (USIA) 
actively planned and executed disinformation against the Soviets.45 Some well-known 
examples of the Soviets’ focused media and active measures included falsehoods about 
biological warfare. One of the false stories leaked by the Soviets, addressed by the AMWG, 
regarded the United States’ supposed attempt to commit mass ethnocide using 
pathogens.46 The KGB47 also used media releases in India’s Patriot newspaper to accuse 
the United States of waging biological warfare, specifically of intentionally spreading 
acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS) to innocent U.S. populations, specifically 
to people of African ethnicities. This misinformation circulated throughout India, 
Cameroon, Portugal, Cuba, and other locations and was ultimately shared by U.S. news 
anchor Dan Rather.48  
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44 United States Information Agency, “Soviet Active Measures in the Era of Glasnost: A Report to 
Congress by the United States Information Agency” (Washington, DC: United States Information Agency, 
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47 Mark M. Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy (New York: SAGE Publications, 2006), 
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C. CAPITALISM VERSUS COMMUNISM: PRESIDENT RONALD 
REAGAN AND PRESIDENT MIKHAIL GORBACHEV 
Unsurprisingly, in the 1980s, the United States and the USSR placed the most 
emphasis in the media on political ideology in the frame of democratic capitalism versus 
communism.49 In 1981, President Ronald Reagan commenced his presidency with a strong 
address and negative moral labeling of the Soviet Union, so as to garner domestic and 
international support. Known as the “great communicator,”50 President Reagan took a hard 
stance and implemented numerous initiatives against the Soviet Union, increasing media 
content and press conferences in response to Soviet disinformation attempts meant to 
undermine the United States’ desired narrative. The United States also spent an enormous 
amount of money to portray the Soviet Union as a threat.  
1. The Freeze Movement 
While far less funded than the defense establishments of the United States and 
Soviet Union and pro-weapons lobby in the United States, the grassroots Freeze movement 
still managed to accomplish significant benchmarks in disarmament. These efforts 
influenced policy leading to the arms reduction agreements started under President Reagan. 
The three most significant media periods for peace and anti-nuclear mobilization were (a) 
1945–1949, in which the scientists’ movement established The Bulletin of the Atomic 
Scientists; (b) 1957–1963, for organization against atmospheric nuclear testing; and, (c), 
1980–1984, during which the nuclear freeze movement arose.51 In the 1980s, Randall 
Forsberg of SIPRI was a leading voice for the anti-nuclear weapon movement, which 
ultimately led to the largest display of opposition to the arms race by nearly one million 
Americans in New York City.52 The theme, “Freeze the Arms Race-Fund Human Needs” 
resulted in petitions with signatures from over 2.3 million Americans.53 This resulted in a 
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referendum in the fall of 1982 by over one-third of the U.S. electorate.54 The majority of 
anti-nuclear weapon groups were mainly religious groups, pro-women groups, and student 
organizations, and, in 1984, some of the issues they raised were incorporated into the 
Democratic Party’s platform. Twenty-five national labor unions also backed this 
movement.55 The Freeze activists used information dissemination and media, developing 
and distributing various documents that informed of perceived risks and sought to educate 
about how to make change and connect with related events and people.  
During the same time, Soviet authorities also encouraged anti-nuclear war letters 
from the Soviet population, including academic institutions and their personnel, to be 
directed toward President Reagan and sent to the White House.56 While the USSR’s 
influence on the Freeze movement did not represent all of the movement, the Soviets did 
use the movement’s desire to stop nuclear weapons to their advantage. One of the 
Communist Party’s chief ideologues, Mikhail Suslov, said that 
particular attention must be given to bringing into the peace movement trade 
unions and women’s, youth, co-operative, sports, cultural, and educational, 
religious and other organizations as well as scientists, writers, journalists, 
cultural workers, members of parliament and other political and public men 
and women who come forward in defense of peace and against war…Wide 
application should be made of the new and effective forms of mass struggles 
for peace which have fully justified themselves, such as peace committees 
in town and country, petitions and protests, popular referendums- such as 
are widely practiced in France and Italy. Publication and distribution of 
literature exposing war preparations; collection of funds for the struggle for 
peace; organization of boycotts of films, newspapers, books, magazines, 
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broadcasting companies, institutions, and individuals that preach a new 
war- all these are vital duties of the Communist and Workers’ parties.57 
The Freeze movement eventually organized into established anti-war organizations 
in the United States, including those that were partially Soviet-influenced and -funded. The 
World Peace Council (WPC) was the main tool for Soviet access and influence with origins 
as far back the 1940s.58 However, historically and in modern times, the World Peace 
Council was and is “an anti-imperialist, democratic, independent and non-aligned 
international movement of mass action,” including for the elimination of nuclear 
weapons.59 Later in the 1980s, this organization created the U.S. Peace Council (USPC). 
Importantly, the Freeze movement was not centered around the WPC or USPC, nor did 
those organizations represent more than a small portion of the movement to ban nuclear 
weapons, but this thesis closely considered both organizations for the purposes of 
understanding Soviet influence attempts. The main target of the Soviet effort to 
propagandize the Freeze movement was the North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO).60 The WPC, also funded by the KGB in multiple key locations around the world, 
used the slogan of “Say No to Star Wars.”61 This campaign was directly engaged against 
the United States, the U.K., and France. The WPC continued the pressure in the late 1970s, 
calling for protests against the neutron bomb and publishing a newsletter, “Peace Courier,” 
that highlighted the protests.62 In 1982, the USPC urged its members in a formal letter to 
support disarmament and made the following demands: “1. Stop and Reverse the Arms 
Race, and 2. Cut the Military Budget; Transfer Funds to Human Needs.”63  
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The public advocacy and messaging on nuclear weapons and war, regardless of 
political position, relied heavily on attempts to influence media and social discourse. This 
occurred in various forms, including rallies, protests, townhall meetings, pamphlets, 
newspaper articles, news broadcasts, and political cartoons.64 The activists were 
caricatured in a wave of cartoons that freely publicized the ongoing Cold War and nuclear 
war threat as shown in Figure 1.65  
 
Figure 1. Example of a historical cartoon that satirizes and utterly 
misconstrues the Freeze movement and the arms verification 
process66 
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65 Gamson and Stuart, “Media Discourse as a Symbolic Contest,” 82. 




The Freeze movement era also created an academic interest in the effects of nuclear 
war that documented the psychological impacts, media dissemination flow, and collective 
action of anti-nuclear groups. In 1998, for example, American scholar Jeffrey Knopf’s 
mixed-methods research concluded that there was a significant impact of societal activism 
on arms control and disarmament within the United States.67 
Gamson and Stuart describe this Cold War media, specifically cartoons, by its 
framing, in which they describe a package with internal structure surrounding a central 
concept or frame of concern. Each package offers its own set of symbols, which suggest 
the core concept and enables the use of metaphors, catch phrase, or similar imaging.68 U.S. 
media core themes throughout the Cold War included Soviet expansion, protracted conflict 
[unlimited world communization], and Armageddon [religious variant]. Soviet expansion 
led the U.S. media theme, which Gamson and Stuart discuss:  
The issue is what’s the best way to deal with an expansionist Soviet Union 
so that it will eventually change its ways. The United States doesn’t start 
fights but we can’t be pushed around either. Nor are we willing to see our 
friends bullied—we have a moral responsibility to protect the weak to the 
extent that we can. The Soviet Union is a classic expansionist power seeking 
to extend its control whenever it can make or exploit an opportunity. The 
best way to deal with a bully like that is to be strong and provocative. The 
danger of was comes when, by our appearing weak, the bully is encouraged 
to take advantage and then we can’t avoid fighting back. Keeping U.S. 
nuclear forces equal or superior to Soviet nuclear forces will deter Soviet 
adventurism and best keep the nuclear peace.69 
According to Gamson and Stuart, then, the question was how to deal with a bully—one 
with nuclear capability.  
In contrast, a separate package of themes emerged from the peace movement 
efforts. Although these groups were relatively underfunded, they produced remarkably 
powerful packages that encouraged people to mobilize in support of the anti-nuclear 
                                                 
67 Knopf, Domestic Society and International Cooperation, 247. 
68 Gamson and Stuart, “Media Discourse as a Symbolic Contest,” 60. 
69 Gamson and Stuart. 
18 
weapons effort. For example, Gamson and Stuart give the following example of the media 
packaging by peace movements: 
No nation can ensure its own security at the expense of another. Common 
security necessitates real steps toward nuclear and conventional 
disarmament, economic and social development, and active conflict 
resolution. Because there is no possible defense against nuclear attack, 
military power and nuclear weapons cannot make a nation fundamentally 
secure. A militarized approach to security on both sides has promoted global 
polarization and an ongoing danger of the ultimate nuclear catastrophe. 
United States policy toward the Soviet Union must reject dangerous 
confrontation and promote mutual cooperation, trade, cultural interaction, 
problem solving, and peacemaking.70 
2. Star Wars Influencers: President Gorbachev’s Media Freedom 
Attempts, President Reagan’s “Hot Mic,” and the INF 
President Gorbachev, in his deliberate acts to bring glasnost (openness) and 
perestroika (restructuring) to the USSR, opened up a seemingly small opportunity to begin 
allowing non-state media. Even well-known U.S. journalists and media executives, such 
as Ted Turner, engaged Russian leadership to gain advantage in burgeoning media 
markets.71 The attempt to break into Russian markets ultimately failed due to the strictly 
limited allowance of foreign investment and lack of connections to the Russian 
oligarchy.72 Gorbachev’s openness caused much disarray as media, in particular Vzglyad, 
with a striking contrast to Russia’s Vzglyad narrative today,73 enabled a wide-ranging 
Western and/or open discussion about information that was normally withheld from the 
public.74 The small exceptions to making the media amicable to publishing controversial 
pieces enabled a broader effort that challenged Gorbachev’s effort to control the 
information narrative.75 
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President Reagan was known for his eagerness to label the evil of the Soviet empire, 
but he also made very open remarks that received a quick-fire response within Soviet news. 
One example is President Reagan’s offhand radio remarks in which he stated, “My fellow 
Americans, I am pleased to tell you today that I’ve signed legislation that will outlaw 
Russia forever. We begin bombing in five minutes.” In a staunch response, the Soviet 
official press fired back: 
TASS is authorized to state that the Soviet Union deplores the U.S. 
President’s invective, unprecedentedly hostile toward the U.S.S.R. and 
dangerous to the cause of peace. This conduct is incompatible with the high 
responsibility borne by leaders of states, particularly nuclear powers, for the 
destinies of their own people and for the destinies of mankind.76 
The U.S. Department of State said that “the Soviet Union is blowing this subject way out 
of proportion for propaganda purposes.” The administration, notably President Reagan, 
apologized for the unintended effects, yet this type of statement occurred more than once 
during his time as president.77 
The INF Treaty served as a ceiling on nuclear efforts for the following decades until 
the most recent U.S. withdrawal,78 meaning that the Freeze movement did accomplish a 
substantial part of its goals. When the Cold War ended, the United States claimed success 
and realigned its geopolitical ties around the world. Previous Soviet states also sought new 
relevancy and realigned to foster economic growth and cultural globalization.  
D. CHAPTER CONCLUSION  
The Soviet oligarchy’s use of Cold War information strategy serves as a critical 
opportunity in learning to shift into an assertive and timely offensive information strategy. 
This chapter discussed the historical height of nuclear armament and the tit-for-tat media 
war between the Soviet Union, while international and domestic peace movements, 
particularly the Freeze movement, aimed to eliminate nuclear arms. Both governments and 
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Freeze movement organizations used media in various forms to publicized their narratives 
while gaining needed support. This chapter serves as a foundation in understanding today’s 
tit-for-tat media and the discourse within social media about strategic nuclear weapons. 
Chapter III provides a detailed description of the existing Russian government narratives 




III. MEDIA FRAMING AND NARRATIVE 
Following Chapter II’s historical snapshot, Chapter III focuses on media content 
generated by Russian state-affiliated media reporting on two specific matters, the Status-6 
“reveal” and the INF suspension to clarify Russia’s potential objectives, narratives, and 
influence methods to inform and gain support from select groups and individuals. The chapter 
interprets news media content by applying various theoretical perspectives, which form a 
basis for understanding Russia’s media methodologies. For example, framing is a way to 
understand media beyond basic biases and in consideration of cognitive domains while 
relating the presentation of the content to the broader cultural or political context.79 In the 
words of Erving Goffman, framing defines “a situation” in which disputants, or belligerents, 
defend their interpretation.80 Russia’s cultural, sociological, political, and psychological 
framing aimed at influencing audiences is tailored to instill fear, reflect regime power, and to 
discredit the West. Each frame, or, in this case, each piece of media narrative, is bound 
together with various aspects of “footing”81 or “alignments between one another as well as 
between themselves and what is said.”82 Although Russia’s content is framed to varying 
degrees, each actor or social media account, the broadcast node, demonstrates similar pro-
Russian and anti-West narratives. Following a note on methodology, the chapter examines 
Russia’s framing and narrative, psychological framing, influence tactics, and the audiences. 
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A. METHODOLOGY  
This chapter’s theory includes, but is not limited to, the CNN Effect,83 principles of 
influence and persuasion,84 media, cultural, and psychological framing, and social movement 
theory. The thesis uses these theories and methodology based on historical understanding of 
Soviet and Russian influence efforts throughout the Cold War while considering the existing 
empirical research and lessons learned in opportunity, access, and speed, enabled by today’s 
technologies. In recent years, the West has closely considered and recognized Russia’s ability 
to seize resources and initiative in efforts to influence political processes. This chapter, 
therefore, applies historical and recently published scholarly evidence and primary research 
in consideration of Russia’s orchestrated media strategy on the topic of nuclear weapons. 
Russian leadership and opponent narrative acts as major leading factors upon the media, a 
dependent variable. 
Russia’s current-day media empire developed out of its Soviet past, and some media 
organizations from that time still exist and espouse similar themes as during the Cold War. 
After struggling after the USSR’s dissolution, state media revolutionized and reorganized in 
the following two decades. In the early 21st century, Russia’s media construct shifted under 
the control of the Russian regime and oligarchy. Organizations such as TASS, derived from 
the former long form of Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union, Vzglyad, and RIA Novosti, 
evolved over time and fluctuated in their ownership. Media such as RT (formerly Russia 
Today) and Sputnik are tailored toward Western audiences and have branches that specifically 
target U.S. audiences. For additional Russian-affiliated news organizations, see the website 
of the Federation of American Scientists (FAS).85 
The Soviets actively used Far-East media outlets for the dissemination of news stories, 
such as the example of the false story of the U.S. government developing AIDS to kill African-
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Americans.86 This thesis’s primary research shows that Russian themes and similar content 
are still being espoused from Indian and Far-East affiliated outlets; whether because of Far 
Eastern independent efforts or possibly cooption by Russia’s media, media content is released 
and further disseminated within Far-East news outlets in English, such as the 
theindiansubcontinent.com and The Hindu, and much of it is exaggerated and 
conspiratorial.87 The thesis further explores theindiansubcontinent.com in Chapter IV. 
The methods and themes used to diffuse content on the Status-6 (see Figure 2 and 
Figure 3) and the INF dissolution differ in the following way: the Status-6 is presented as 
threatening weaponry to instill fear in audiences while making the information about the 
weapon itself scarce and esoteric. The INF content, however, while still seemingly aimed at 
controlling the narrative, is deliberately and consistently disseminated with persuasion rooted 
in authority and social proof.88 Robert Cialdini defines authority as the belligerent’s, or 
marketer’s, reinforcement and requirement of the audience’s submission and obedience.89 
Social proof is loosely defined as an individual’s belief that something is true based on the 
acceptance and deliverance by others he or she trusts, often because of personal and cultural 
bias.90 The internet provides opportunity for multiple trolls, bots, and seemingly persuasive 
authoritative figures, including seemingly educated figures, to recite, share, and endorse 
Russian media content. 
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Figure 2. The “accidentally” and widely disseminated photo of the Status-6 
autonomous nuclear torpedo bomb originating from Russian state 
media and posted on Twitter in 201591 
 
Figure 3. Russian-state news headline about the Status-6, Poseidon, 
torpedo92 
                                                 
91 Source: Pavel Podvig (@russianforces), “Today in Sochi Putin is shown proposal for Status-6 - a 
massive ‘dirty bomb’ weapon system developed by Rubin,” Twitter, November 10, 2015, 12:17 p.m., 
https://twitter.com/russianforces/status/664175004670644225. 
92 Source: “Poseidon Underwater Drone Trials Confirm Its Speed, Unlimited Range,” TASS, February 
5, 2019, https://tass.com/defense/1043379 (October 22, 2019). 
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Figure 4. Russian-state media photo about U.S. intelligence of Poseidon93  
B. INFLUENCE TACTICS 
Robert Cialdini’s ideas about influence provide a simple way to better understand 
and categorize the persuasion tactics employed by Russia’s media. The media content on 
Status-6 uses principles and methods of authority, scarcity, channeled attention, threats, 
and even sexual lures.94 By agenda-setting, Russia’s media selects only specific details to 
share with its audience, details that benefit the Russian regime’s political agenda. Initial 
reporting of the Status-6 occurred a few months prior to the accidental reveal; Bill Gertz 
used insider knowledge to detail a similar weapon under the name Kanyon in the 
Washington Free Beacon, though it failed to conjure major attention.95 Furthermore, the 
idea of a similar weapon was envisioned by a Russian nuclear scientist, Andrei Sakharov, 
                                                 
93 Source: “Russian Underwater Drone Poseidon Keeps U.S. Intel on the Alert,” Sputnik News, March 
26, 2019, https://sputniknews.com/science/201903261073561919-udnerwater-drone-poseidon-intelligence-
us/. 
94 “Authority,” “scarcity,” “attention,” “threatening,” and “sexual lure” are terms from two of 
Cialdini’s books on influence: Influence and Pre-Suasion. 
95 Jeffrey Lewis, “Putin’s Doomsday Machine,” Foreign Policy, November 12, 2015, 
https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/11/12/putins-doomsday-machine-nuclear-weapon-us-russia/; Bill Gertz, 
September 8, 2015, “Russia Building Nuclear-Armed Drone Submarine.” Washington Free Beacon, 
https://freebeacon.com/national-security/russia-building-nuclear-armed-drone-submarine/ (November 21, 
2018). 
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in the 1950s, suggesting this weapon has been in development for a long time.96 The 
supposed accidental reveal of the Status-6, the Russian government’s reaction to 
withdrawal of related media on the reveal, and framing the weapon as unique and unlike 
that of any other nation-state all evidences the principle of scarcity as construed as a sense 
of secrecy. Publicly available information about this weapon is scarce yet what is available 
instills fear and concern.97 This unique nuclear autonomous torpedo bomb being only 
partially revealed and supposedly as an accident at that apparently serves to conjure interest 
of an exaggerated weapon. Shortly after President Putin’s early 2018 speech on Russia’s 
strategic weapons capabilities, U.S. Defense Secretary James N. Mattis stated that he 
assessed Russia’s military capability as unchanged and “still years away,” reflecting little 
or no concern of Russia’s actual ability to shift the balance of power.98 
Violence and sexual seduction are also evident in Russia’s online propaganda, 
which often leverages physically attractive women to espouse some nuclear-related content 
in both English and Russian.99 For example, anyone with internet access can view Maria 
Katasonova in a YouTube video promising that Russia will destroy the world if it loses the 
fight in Ukraine.100 While originally posted in Russian, the video has also been translated 
and further shared. Evidently, though not in all cases, Russia’s media strategy includes 
using attractive women engaging in face-to-face communications.101  
                                                 
96 “Status-6 / Kanyon - Ocean Multipurpose System - Russian and Soviet Nuclear Forces,” 
GlobalSecurity.org, November 21, 2018, https://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/russia/status-6.htm. 
97 Cialdini, Influence, 20. 
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C. RUSSIA’S FRAMING AND NARRATIVE 
The Russian regime enables media and strategic narratives that parallel its goals for 
perceived regime power and also anti-West rhetoric in a form of direct strategic 
communication. The thesis considers research on Russia’s consistent media themes that 
target U.S. audiences as a dependent variable, reflecting the regime’s strategic discourse 
with adversarial state leaders.102 The independent variables that contribute to the media 
output are: the consideration of Russia’s highly influential-on-its-media government, the 
media oligarchy, Russian nationalism, U.S. media and press releases, U.S. leaders’ 
statements, historic use of conspiratorial framing, and the ease with which today’s social 
media and the internet can diffuse information. Russia’s press is highly restricted, 
degrading its ability to espouse countering views.103 Mainstream broadcasting, such as RT 
or Sputnik, share content generally perceived as less conspiratorial but often limited in truth 
while other more conspiratorial outlets, such as lenta.ru or Vzglyad, freely produce and 
disseminate conspiratorial content, which is then often shared by trolls and bots.104 As 
became apparent during this primary research, some of these websites and nodes also come 
from more than Russia’s media; India- and Indonesia-affiliated websites and nodes also 
produce extreme conspiratorial content, including advertisements, to promote nuclear-
weapons related content designed to instill fear. Today’s search engines and web browsers 
make it even easier to translate the content into English, meaning that Russia’s media 
content is that much more accessible.  
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Russian media’s agenda-setting105 and conspiratorial framing106 within the media 
is also not new, but recent studies illustrate how convincing “fake news” and cultural 
framing can be at placing a desired narrative simply and realistically in viewers’ minds. 
Other scholarly material, from RAND and others, reflects similar framing of content.107 
During the Cold War, the Soviets used media disinformation in attempts to cover up the 
crumbling Soviet economy; this method is still used by Russian media today.108 William 
Gamson and Andre Modigliani were the first scholars to decipher media in the larger 
context of public opinion on nuclear power, and their works provide a relative way to 
deconstruct today’s Russian media.109  
With multiple outlets, Russia’s media espouses thematic content in tit-for-tat 
commentary relative to U.S. actions on a strategic scale. Although many of these themes 
seem synchronized, individual media and key speaker notes also reveal a less coordinated 
effort. Recently, specific to the INF treaty suspension, Stopfake.org discredited Russian 
attempts to control the media narrative.110 Stopfake.org also identified contradictory 
information stated by the commander of Russia’s missile forces: on January 17, 2019, 
Russia’s Deputy Foreign Minister stated on air that the 9M729 missile “has never been 
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tested for a range banned.”111 Not long after, Lieutenant-General Mikail Matveyevsky 
stated that “all launches of ground-to-ground missiles were conducted at a range not 
exceeding the range of the INF limits. The only exceptions are missile launches of the 
Strategic Rocket Forces, the notifications for which were sent to the U.S.”112 
Specific to Russia’s nuclear-weapons-related content, themes capitalize on 
principles of authority and often use fake (nonexistent) authorities and intentionally 
misquote various officials to meet the regime’s agenda. Keeping in mind the influence 
tactics previously mentioned, the media themes have also seen a similar trend, particularly 
in mirror-imaging, in society at large and serve as an extension of Russia’s efforts to shape 
societal ideals.113 The thesis extrapolated the following themes from various Russian 
media,114 and are considered in the context of more recent Russian media as an extension 
of foreign policy during the tit-for-tat media about the INF Treaty.115 
1. INF Themes 
• The United States violated the INF treaty 
• Authorities confirm Russia’s compliance and obligation to the INF 
• The U.S. INF suspension caused Russia’s INF suspension 
                                                 
111 StopFake.org. 
112 “Минобороны Предъявило Доказательства Отсутствия Нарушений ДРСМД Со Стороны 
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Report,” Journal of Social Issues 17, no. 3 (April 14, 2010): 45–56, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-
4560.1961.tb01682.x; Mikhail Tsypkin, “Russia, America and Missile Defense,” Defense & Security 
Analysis 28, no. 1 (March 1, 2012): 55–64, https://doi.org/10.1080/14751798.2012.651379; Sarah Oates, 
“Russian Media in the Digital Age: Propaganda Rewired,” Russian Politics 1, no. 4 (December 30, 2016): 
405, 406, https://doi.org/10.1163/2451-8921-00104004. 
114 Focused qualitative review for the above specific narratives was on RT and Sputnik. 
115 Yablokov, “Conspiracy Theories as a Russian Public Diplomacy Tool.” 
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• The U.S. will place missiles in Russia’s near-abroad 
• The U.S. is Russia’s competitor and a world aggressor116 
• The NATO alliance threatens Russia and its partners 
• The INF demise boosts the U.S. defense industry 
2. Status-6 Themes 
• Russian media accidentally revealed the Status-6 
• Russia is technologically advanced and capable of nuclear attacks 
• Status-6 can destroy the United States and the West 
• Russia’s government is a top nuclear world power 
• The U.S. is Russia’s competitor and a world aggressor 
• The NATO alliance threatens Russia and its partners 
D. PSYCHOLOGICAL FRAMING 
Scholars argue that even the idea of nuclear warfare can have serious effects on the 
human mind. In 2001, Charles A. Salter said, “Most people fear a nuclear/radiological 
threat even more than a conventional explosion due both to their inability to perceive the 
presence of radiation with the ordinary human senses and to concerns about perceived long-
lasting radiation effects.”117 The psychological impacts and fear of nuclear proliferation 
or use are the focus of a handful of authors who agree on a significant set of worsened 
                                                 
116 Russian media also instigate the topic with inclusion of evidence with the first nuclear attack on 
Japan 
117 Charles A. Salter, “Psychological Effects of Nuclear and Radiological Warfare,” Military 
Medicine 166, supp. 2 (December 2001): 17–18, https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/11778420; 
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mental health issues over the concern of overwhelming medical emergencies and extreme 
dark fantasies in the minds of some adults.118 
In fact, the majority of the U.S. public apparently believes that the next major attack 
against the United States will be from nuclear weapons. According to Pew Survey results, 
most say that war, terrorism and environmental catastrophes are at least 
probable by the year 2050. Nearly six-in-ten (58%) see another world war 
as definite or probable; 53% say the same about the prospect for a major 
terrorist attack on the United States involving nuclear weapons.119  
Also, according to surveys from 2010 and 2015, people believe that, 
 
while many believe that the specter of large-scale nuclear war is now behind 
us, not all Americans agree. A 2010 CNN/Opinion Research Corporation 
survey found that 12% think a nuclear war is very likely in the next decade, 
26% somewhat likely, 29% not too likely, and only 32% said it was not 
likely at all. And as recently as last November, a 60 Minutes/Vanity Fair 
Poll found that 35% most fear a nuclear war putting an end to humanity, 
compared to 23% who worry about a deadly virus, 15% the Rapture, 15% 
global warming, and 8% an asteroid hitting the Earth.120  
 
In a recent 2018 accidental false nuclear alarm in Hawaii, citizens demonstrated that they 
did not understand how to react and displayed frantic concern; analysis of the reactions via 
Twitter reflected widespread unpreparedness.121 
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Russia’s careful releases of information—such as target locations on the U.S. 
coast—are instrumental in fostering fear abroad and in the near-abroad. Chapter V 
describes how this tactic is used in deception and psychological warfare. According to 
Weisburd, Watts, and Berger, both RT and Sputnik promoted reporting on a false bomb 
attack on Disney in Paris; the authors claim it caused stock markets to drop.122 If accurate, 
RT’s and Sputnik’s strategy clearly signaled their ability to leverage psychological framing 
for immediate effects. James Thompson published studies on the impact of this fear, on the 
production of stress, and on negotiations and psychological processes that are negatively 
affected by bias and cognitive dissonance.123  
The Russian media reporting on Russia’s autonomous Poseidon possibly reflects 
an attempt to shape perceptions of specific audiences that oppose autonomous weapons 
development. Kevin Young and Charli Carpenter conducted a major survey to determine 
people’s perceptions of autonomous weapons and concluded that “consumption of 
frightening ‘armed AI’ films is associated with greater opposition to autonomous 
weapons.”124 The counter-movement against fully autonomous weapons, including groups 
such as Human Rights Watch, portrays the weapons as negative and, according to Young 
and Carpenter, these perceptions evidentially reflect electoral behavior and impact on 
foreign policy.125 
E. THE AUDIENCES 
Russia has long tried to influence and disinform its own citizens as a way of testing 
its content and to increase domestic support for the regime. This research reveals that 
Russia’s nuclear-related content, specific to Russian audiences and in Russian, is highly 
critical of the United States while reflecting a strategic elitist view of Russia’s hegemony. 
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English-language content is subtler and can often be difficult to debunk. Content is framed 
in simple ways to reach a large variety of audiences. 
Russia’s media targets the following main audiences: domestic populations to 
increase nationalism, near-abroad populations to increase fear and recruit Russian 
ethnicities,126 Western audiences to gain sympathy and to instill fear of a hegemonic 
power, and Western decision-makers and academics to achieve political objectives. This 
thesis focuses on the last two, Russia’s efforts to influence U.S. audiences, specifically the 
following groups.  
Secondary audiences, who serve as conduits of potential collective action to 
primary audiences: 
• scholars, academics, and historians 
• general population and voters 
• thinktank members 
• Russian expatriates and sympathizers 
 Primary audiences, who serve as policymakers or in other roles within the U.S. 
government: 
• the Executive branch 
• the Legislative branch 
• Department of Defense officials 
• U.S. nuclear policy officials 
Nancy Baym points out that social media provides an extension to one’s life and 
also provides new social norms and allowable fantasy projection.127 This opportunity can 
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then be used for good or ill, such as what the world has witnessed in Russia’s use of 
coordinators, trolls, and media co-opters.128 Over the past three decades, scholars have 
grappled with the CNN Effect, the ability of media to shape policymakers’ perspectives and 
actions; this theory also applies to the Status-6 and INF media cycles.129 This tactic exists 
in the nuclear discourse and the networks that promote Russian nuclear-topic content. 
F. CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
The media content disseminated by RT, Sputnik, and others illustrates a highly 
active cycle, reflecting themes derived from inter-relations between Russia and the United 
States (and the West); however, the Russian content clearly elects to publish themes only 
in the interest of Russian government and not of transparency. Two major topics, Status-6 
and the INF, demonstrate clear messaging that has directly contributed the framework of 
the U.S. National Security Strategy and the Nuclear Posture Review. Chapter IV more 
clearly articulates and illustrates the existing audiences and the relationship to Russia’s 
media networks, further exploring the potential for online actors to act as conduits for 
change within U.S. political processes. 
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IV. SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS OF RUSSIA’S MEDIA 
TWITTER NETWORK 
In previous chapters, the thesis discussed historical patterns of the Soviet and 
Russian regimes’ information warfare and media and media content analysis. The USSR 
used disinformation to influence audiences, both government decisionmakers and mass 
publics, in support of the regime’s political goals. With the explosion of both the Internet 
and social media, Russia has taken advantage of widespread, often anonymous access, to 
information-dissemination channels. Recent election-meddling provides insight into the 
methods used by the RF to assemble groups of people, to diffuse information, and to gain 
access to audiences around the world. The thesis’s exploratory research of Russian Twitter 
broadcast news media nodes130 provides additional insight into the effort to diffuse 
Russian regime narratives to Western audiences. Determining influence in a conventional 
sense, determining identities and broader and more orchestrated efforts by the Russian 
government to influence U.S. policy, is outside the thesis’s scope. Instead, Chapter IV 
provides the reader a snapshot, a specific case study, of the online social network (OSN) 
and modeling algorithms to determine prominent actors within the OSN and to, in turn, 
uncover the possibilities and opportunities for Russian influence. The research determines 
overall network centralization and the ego networks131 of Russian media accounts, 
illuminating Russian information operations. Following a results summary and notes on 
methodology, Chapter IV specifically provides four forms of information: first, the 
quantitative analysis and code book in seven sections, data boundaries, data source, data, 
quantitative understanding of overall network, subgroups of the network, key nodes of the 
overall network, and Russia’s media ego networks; second, analysis of social media; third, 
analysis of Russia’s attempts to influence OSN through advertisement; and, last, the 
potential for OSN to lead to physical mobilization.  
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A. RESULTS SUMMARY AND NOTE ON METHODOLOGY 
The results reflect that both Russian state-affiliated media broadcast nodes and 
foreign and domestic diplomatic and defense-oriented nodes contribute to the diffusion of 
Russian media and propaganda. Furthermore, Russian foreign policy nodes are also 
deliberately spreading content and are highly central132 in the network. For example, far-
East media and political nodes, including but not limited to the Hindu Times, Indian 
Subcontinent, and senior political Indian figures disseminate pro-Russian content. Senior 
political leaders of India further act as nodes to expand unique ideas into and outside of the 
core network into further centralized networks.133 Russia propagates some similar content 
to its domestic audiences as it does to audiences abroad. The audiences vary dramatically, 
but the receptive network of audiences includes scholars, pro-Russian regime and anti-
autonomous weapons groups, as well as anti-nuclear weapons groups, U.S. policymakers 
and leaders, international organizations, journalists, Western media organizations, and 
other demographics also responsive to “fake news.” Some individual nodes within the 
network leverage “mentions” to post content favorable to the Russian government by 
highlighting the U.S. Executive and Legislative Branches current and former members, 
therefor leveraging existing U.S. political circles and audiences. For example, 
@realDonaldTrump is often included in posts by @SputnikInt and other Russian media. 
The tactic demonstrates a method used by some accounts to expand Russian content into 
U.S. policy circles to gain support and/or to enable questioning of U.S. policymaker 
audiences. However, both competing narratives, pro-Russian and anti-Russian nuclear 
weapons narratives of opponents, exist within the content of the overall network. 
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This research is restricted to tweets from Twitter broadcast nodes and followers of 
Russian news accounts. Data was collected by members of the Common Operational 
Research Environment (CORE) Laboratory through an endpoint included in the Twitter 
Application Programming Interface (API). The thesis’s research of the CORE Lab data 
contributes to understanding the audiences and how these audiences should be considered 
in their potential for political activity.  
B. QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS AND CODE BOOK 
1. Data Boundaries 
From July through September 2019, with assistance from the CORE Lab, the 
thesis derived the actors and relational ties in this network solely from open source 
Twitter data. The data set was pared down to only include posts during the time of the 
United States’ withdrawal from the INF treaty, from January 25, 2019 to June 1, 2019.  
2. Data Source 
The researcher created an initial list of thirty-five nodes, including but not limited 
to @RT_com, @RT_America, @SputnikInt, and @TASSagency_en, determined from 
primary and secondary research, and provided the list to the CORE Lab with a request to 
pull their wall posts. From these initial nodes, the researcher gathered a list of additional 
nodes for analysis. As such, the scope of data collection included the first- and second-
degree connections for the original thirty-five nodes. The resulting Twitter dataset is 
comprised of 3,587 nodes. The network reflects agents that are more likely to reply, 
mention, or retweet information among each other.  
The researcher structured the data for this analysis as an edge list for relational 
characteristics for the nodes in the network and a node list, characterizing attributes of each 
node. The edge list represents directed one-way communications between the nodes.  
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3. The Data 
a. Relational Data (User to User- Understanding the ties) 
The relational data, in the form of an edge list, represents the ties (relationship, arcs) 
between the nodes and is a compellation of each follower, reply, mention, and retweet in a 
matrix. This one-way directed communication is also termed an arc, which includes the 
following: replies, and mentions, and retweets.134 For example, user A may reply to user 
B about a news article or user A may retweet user B’s news article. User A follows user B 
on Twitter, but user B does not follow user A. These examples reflect a one-way directed 
tie, or arc, from user A to user B. A synopsis of the binary relationships follows.  
• Followers are users and the accounts that they follow and befriend on 
Twitter, 
• Reply and Mention is defined as a link created when users respond or 
mention other users, and 
• Retweets are links created when users repost another account’s content 
b. Attribute Data (Describes characteristics of each node/user account) 
Information gathered via Twitter is self-reported by the user account (node), 
meaning the individual’s (online actor’s) self-declared attributes, such as location and 
name are unknown to be true. The node list provides attributes, or characteristics, for each 
of the nodes and the nodes’ followers, including the following: 
• User Identification (User ID) is the unique identification number used to 
label each actor for the purpose for data use and tracking; 
• Screen name is a user-selected name which is public; 
• Source is the source device used for Twitter, whether a cellular phone, smart 
device, or computer; 
                                                 
134 “Using Twitter,” Twitter, accessed on October 27, 2019, https://help.twitter.com/en/using-twitter. 
39 
• Location is a self-reported location of the user account; 
• Followers Count is the number of actors following the user account; 
• Friends Count is the number of users the user follows;  
• Account Created at indicates the time and day the user created the account; 
• Verified indicates whether the actor, or Twitter user, used official documents 
to prove their authentic identity to Twitter 
4. Quantitative Understanding of the Overall Network 
The overall union network—all ties between actors, mentions, replies, and 
retweets—encompasses multiple central figures, with emphasis on Russian, Eastern, and 
Western. This analysis focuses on two perspectives of the same network. The first uses 
Girvan-Newman grouping to identify multiple potential sub-groups within the network, 
and the second uses a breakdown of ego-networks of the Russian media nodes.  
The thesis chose to use Newman clustering, to identify subgroups and for 
visualizations in ORA, for its efficiency with large data sets and for the application of edge 
betweenness and its bottom-up approach in relating the nodes.135 Twenty-six groups 
identified with the Newman clustering algorithm within ORA reflect a broad spectrum of 
audiences with varying influence.136 In conjunction with the Newman Method Clustering 
Algorithm, a unionized matrix yielded a Newman Modularity score of .614, meaning the 
network is a very cohesive community structure137 with a higher than average amount of 
ties between nodes. Twenty-six groups were located within the overall network with a 
                                                 
135 Cunningham, Everton, and Murphy, Understanding Dark Networks, Kindle. loc. 2692–2739 of 
7566. 
136 I located groups using Newman Clustering Algorithm, ORA-NetScenes, a joint product of the 
CASOS center at Carnegie Mellon University and Netanomics, October 1, 2019. 
137 M. E. J. Newman and M. Girvan, “Finding and Evaluating Community Structure in Networks,” 
Physical Review E 69, no. 2 (February 2004): 1–15, https://link.aps.org/doi/10.1103/PhysRevE.69.026113; 
M. E. J. Newman, “Equivalence between Modularity Optimization and Maximum Likelihood Methods for 
Community Detection,” Physical Review E 94, no. 5 (November 2016): 1–8, https://link.aps.org/doi/
10.1103/PhysRevE.94.052315. 
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maximum group size of 512 nodes. Seven of these groups are five or less nodes. The 
smallest group size includes four nodes. The average size of each group is 187 while the 
standard deviation is 183 nodes.138 
Determining who is most prominent within the overall and individual ego networks 
is arguably a difficult task for which researchers could use many methods, quantitative and 
qualitative. This social network analysis does not necessarily reflect whether these nodes 
are influential outside of the OSN and does not reflect verified influence on U.S. policy or 
actions outside of the OSN’s online Twitter behavior. Furthermore, this analysis is limited, 
but prompts opportunity for further major studies on the topic. However, according to 
Riquelme and González-Cantergiani, Twitter reflects “four types of public relationships: 
user-to-user, user-to-tweet, tweet-to-tweet and tweet-to-user.”139 Retweeting a node’s 
content is the strongest link between two nodes,140 so the analysis considers that. To 
identify specific understanding of the type of actor—such as disseminator, leaders, 
amplifiers, curators, commentators, idea starters, and viewers—would require increased 
research and reliable methods to differentiate bots from human nodes.141 Russia’s Ministry 
of Defense (MOD), as an extension of the Russian government, has high in-degree, 
meaning more ties are directed toward each of the nodes, in the networks.142 Russia’s 
MOD is a strategic actor that is instrumental in Russia’s weapons development, testing, 
                                                 
138 I located groups using Newman Clustering Algorithm, Union Network, ORA-NetScenes, a joint 
product of the CASOS center at Carnegie Mellon University and Netanomics, October 1, 2019. 
139 Fabián Riquelme and Pablo González-Cantergiani, “Measuring User Influence on Twitter: A 
Survey,” Information Processing & Management 52, no. 5 (August 2015): 949–75, http://arxiv.org/abs/
1508.07951. 
140 Riquelme and González-Cantergiani;m Martin J. Chorley et al., “Human Content Filtering in 
Twitter: the Influence of Metadata,” International Journal of Human-Computer Studies 74 (February 
2015): 32–40, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijhcs.2014.10.001. 
141 Riquelme and González-Cantergiani, “Measuring User Influence on Twitter”; Miguel del Fresno 
García, Alan J. Daly, and Sagrario Segado Sánchez-Cabezudo, “Identifying the New Influencers in the 
Internet Era: Social Media and Social Network Analysis,” Revista Española de Investigaciones 
Sociológicas, 153 (2016): 23–40, http://dx.doi.org/10.5477/cis/reis.153.23). 
142 Stefan Räbiger and Myra Spiliopoulou, “A Framework for Validating the Merit of Properties that 
Predict the Influence of a Twitter User,” Expert Systems with Applications 42, no. 5 (April 2015): 2824–
2834, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eswa.2014.11.006; Riquelme and González-Cantergiani, “Measuring User 
Influence on Twitter.”  
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and strategy development, and MOD’s content is also provided to Russia’s media broadcast 
nodes for their content. 
5. The Subgroups of the Network 
The overall network consists of varying subgroups. The following are subgroups of 
importance as the more influential group nodes have the highest in-degree likely indicating 
followership for information:143 
• Group 1: Anti-nuclear weapons, anti-autonomous robot, and human rights 
advocates nodes, including @marywareham and @BanKillerRobots 
• Group 2: Nuclear security strategists, including @KomissarWhipla and 
@ArmsControlWonk 
• Group 3: Investigative journalists and open source analysists, including 
@AricToler and @ leonidragozin 
• Group 4: U.S. news outlets, U.S. media specialists, and U.S. policymakers, 
including @ realDonaldTrump and @nytimes 
• Group 5: Anti-West rhetoric and anti-West conspiracy news sharing, 
including @VeraVanHorne and @Malinka1102 
• Group 6: Russian government and Russian diplomatic, including 
@RusEmbUSA and @RusCons_TX 
• Group 7: Critical of internal Russian affairs and Russia’s involvement in the 
Ukraine, including @AbraxasSpa and @CalibreObscura 
• Group 8: Russian speakers, pro-Russian content, including @navalny and i_ 
korotchenko 
                                                 
143 I located groups using the Newman Clustering Algorithm, ORA-NetScenes, a joint product of the 
CASOS center at Carnegie Mellon University and Netanomics. October 1, 2019. 
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• Group 9: Defense industry, including missile, anti-ballistic missile, aviation, 
researchers and developers, including @alpaytkn_ss and @ hkilichsword 
• Group 10: Indian-affiliated news and Indian government-affiliated nodes, 
including @ZeeNews and @narendramodi 
Groups 1–10 include actors with highest in-degree, meaning an increased number 
of connections to other nodes within the group. Nodes with the highest total degree 
centrality, meaning the highest of in and out links, have increased access to knowledge and 
diffusion of ideas. However, the provided description of the nodes in each group is not 
indicative or descriptive of all nodes within each individual group. Each group has varying 
nodes, some of which serve as brokers between sub-groups and, therefore, reflect a full 
spectrum of identities and OSN pattern of life. 
The nodes with a high brokerage potential between Newman groups of particular 
relevance to the network would fragment, meaning it would lose the existing diffusion of 
information conduits, if the following nodes were removed: RusEmbUSA, AricToler, and 
controlarms. RusEmbUSA is the Russian embassy in the United States and promotes the 
tweets of its consulates around the world and Russian culture, garners support for the 
freedom of Maria Butina, and highlights its defense industry-including content from 
@mod_russia. RusEmbUSA greatly connects the majority of Russian state-affiliated news 
nodes, therefore its connections enable the broader spread of Russian narrative. Aric Toler 
provides the network an investigative input of information that is critical of Russia while 
also displaying pro-West content. Control Arms provides information about and represents 
the arms control movement. 
6. Key Nodes of the Overall Network  
Figures 4 and 5 present visualizations of the overall network social media analysis. 
Figure 4 is a visual representation of the network with color representing Newman 
subgrouping. Nodes ranking in the top three of all centrality measures are labeled in white. 
The nodes proximity to the center of the visualization represents the node’s centrality to 
the entire network. Figure 4, therefore, is a visualization of the entire network with labels 
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highlighting the most central figures while Figure 5 is a chart to compare the percentage of 
measures of the same visualized most central figures. Figure 5 shows top ten reoccurring 
nodes within the top three rankings of all centrality measures. This research does not cover 
each measure of centrality in depth or focus on any one measure of centrality, but it does 
provide a brief overview of the most central figures and a potential start point for future in-
depth research on the network. 
 
Figure 5. Visualization of the Russian Media Network, Newman subgroups, 
and nodes with the highest centrality144 
                                                 
144 I created the visualization in ORA-NetScenes, a joint product of the CASOS center at Carnegie 
Mellon University and Netanomics. October 1, 2019. 
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Figure 6. Top ten reoccurring nodes within the top three rankings of all 
centrality measures145 
The recurring top-ranked agents are chosen by each node’s recurring position within the 
top three positions of prominence for each of the centrality algorithms within ORA.146 
• KomissarWhipla (Sympathetic of Russian government, nuclear strategist) 
• realDonaldTrump (President Donald Trump, 45th U.S. President) 
• AricToler (lead investigator for Russian-topics for Bellingcat) 
• RusEmbUSA (Russian Embassy in the United States) 
• Narendramodi (Narendra Damodardas Modi, 14th Prime Minister of India)  
• BJP4India (Bharatiya Janata Party of India) 
                                                 
145 I located key entities with ORA-NetScenes, a joint product of the CASOS center at Carnegie 
Mellon University and Netanomics, October 1, 2019. 
146 Centrality measures include total degree, out-degree, in-degree, betweenness, ego betweenness, 
betweenness, closeness, eigenvector, contribution, hub, authority, constraint (structural holes), effective 
network size (structural holes), efficiency (structural holes), PageRank, and clustering coefficient; I located 
key entities with ORA-NetScenes, a joint product of the CASOS center at Carnegie Mellon University and 
Netanomics. October 1, 2019. 
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• 1072188050279723008 (Unknown, possible bot, troll, or deleted account) 
• AtoVisual (Vague or little information, human rights and bio-diversity) 
• JPNadda (Jagat Prakash Nadda, Indian politician) 
• Alay_tark (Turkish speaker, political stance vague) 
The top ten nodes with the highest in-degree of retweeting within the network 
include MID_RF (MFA_russia’s account in Russian language), mfa_russia, 
realDonaldTrump, narendramodi, mod_russia, BJP4India, RT_com, NicolasMaduro, 
EmbassyofRussia, and EmbassyofRussia.147 These accounts reflect an open discourse 
ranging in support of the Russian government, discourse on the conflict in Venezuela, and 
other political discourse. 
The top ten accounts with higher than average values for out-degree, meaning the 
nodes have high number of outward directing arcs, include RusEmbUSA, 
KomissarWhipla, RussianEmbassyC, mission_russian, JPNadda, i_korotchenko, 
PCHannon, RusCons_TX, nstomar, and RusEmbEst.148  
These metrics suggest that India’s politicians are prominently linked to the Russian 
media network on the topic of nuclear weapons. Russian foreign policy and diplomatic 
nodes are highly active and are a major source of information for the networks. Other 
politicians, including ones related to the Ukraine, Iran, and Venezuela, are also reflected in 
various centrality measures.149 Some examples of the Tweets shared between Prime 
Minister Modi and President Putin follow in Figures 6, 7, 8, and 9. 
                                                 
147 I located key entities with ORA-NetScenes, a joint product of the CASOS center at Carnegie 
Mellon University and Netanomics. October 1, 2019. 
148 See previous footnote. 
149 See previous footnote. 
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Figure 7. PM Modi reaffirming his support for President Putin150 
 
Figure 8. PM Modi thanking President Putin for his St. Andrew award151 
                                                 
150 Source: Narenda Modi (@narendramodi), “President Putin remains a source of great strength for 
the India-Russia friendship,” April 12, 2019, 4:38 a.m., https://twitter.com/narendramodi/status/
1116666784197726209. 
151 Source: Narenda Modi (@narendramodi), “Honoured to receive this prestigious award. I thank 




Figure 9. President Putin publicizes PM Modi’s St. Andrew award152 
 
Figure 10. President Putin congratulates PM Modi on his political party’s  
win in the election153 
In consideration of hub and authority centrality,154 the researcher considers the nodes’ 
roles in information diffusion. Hubs and authorities are generally used specifically for sharing 
webpages and searching for understanding within broad-topic subjects. In this case, the 
authorities have information that hubs assume as credible or that answer the hub’s question. 
However, a hub is a node that is a source for many authorities. The top ten hubs within the 
                                                 
152 Source: President of Russia (@KremlinRussia_E), “Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi 
received the Order of St. Andrew for outstanding achievements in promotin partnership with Russia,” 
Twitter, April, 12, 2019, 3:18 a.m., https://twitter.com/KremlinRussia_E/status/1116646881168449537. 
153 Source: President of Russia (@KremlinRussia_E) “Vladimir Putin congratulated Prime Minister 
of India Narendra Modi on the victory of his Bharatiya Janata Party in the general election,” May 23, 2019, 
4:12 a.m., https://twitter.com/KremlinRussia_E/status/1131518220530257921 TWEET 
154 “Hubs and Authorities,” Stanford University, accessed August 14, 2019, https://nlp.stanford.edu/
IR-book/html/htmledition/hubs-and-authorities-1.html. 
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overall network with higher than normal value for retweeting include JPNadda, nstomar, 
smritiirani, BJP4Delhi, shripadynaik, drharshvardhan, ManojTiwariMP, BJP4India, and 
myogiadityanath. Nodes with higher than normal values for authorities centrality include 
narendramodi, BJP4India, and PMOIndia. Again, Indian government affiliated accounts 
assume roles for the transfer of news information. These nodes receive a wide array of 
information from other nodes that send out a large amount of information to a large 
audience.155 
Some Twitter nodes tag to official Russian government nodes, including the MOD. 
This research identifies MOD’s lack of coordination in information warfare with Russia’s 
main media networks. In fact, StopFake.org recognized a conflict of information 
dissemination on the topic of the INF this past January.156 MOD and its main news outlet, 
Zvezda, do not reflect a robust cycle of dissemination compared to the Russian nodes 
RT_com, RT_America, SputnikInt, and Tassagency_en. MOD broadcasts on Twitter mainly 
in Russian but sometimes in English. MOD follows Russia’s diplomatic nodes, but does not 
formally follow Russia’s formal news media nodes.  
7. The Russian Media Ego Networks 
An ego network is an “actor’s (i.e., ego’s)—immediate social environment: the set of 
actors (i.e., alters and neighbors) to which the actor has ties and the ties among them.”157 The 
Russian media ego networks provide the opportunity to determine what other nodes are 
actively referencing, sharing, or retweeting the specific individual Russian-state affiliated 
media nodes: RT, Sputnik, and TASS. The conventional media, specific to webpages, are 
slightly different between the three as previously discussed in the previous chapter. Analysis 
of the ego networks is also a method to determine which nodes have the strongest relationship 
with the four Russian media ego nodes: RT_com, RT_America, SputnikInt, and 
Tassagency_en in the OSN.  
                                                 
155 I located key entities using ORA-NetScenes, a joint product of the CASOS center at Carnegie 
Mellon University and Netanomics. October 1, 2019. 
156 StopFake.org, “Russia Demonstrates Missile Claiming No Violation.” 
157 Cunningham, Everton, and Murphy, Understanding Dark Networks. 
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However, the Ego-Network clustering algorithm in ORA produced the following 
networks with subgroup membership: 
• RT_com ego-network consists of 403 nodes 
• RT_America ego-network consists of 184 nodes 
• SputnikInt ego-network consists of 162 nodes 
• Tassagency_en ego-network consists of 124 nodes 
The ego networks include a variety of nodes located throughout the multiple ego networks. 
Many of the nodes self-identify as Russian government and state-policy nodes, including 
Russian embassies, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and 
Russian Mission United Nations. Surprisingly, Russia’s Ministry of Defense (MOD) is not 
highly central within the ego-networks. 
Figures 10 through 13 offer ORA-generated visualizations of each of the ego-
networks focused around Russian media broadcast nodes. The colorization of the nodes and 
ties represent Newman subgrouping. The strength in the ties is reflected by the width of the 
ties. Within the visualizations, the sociograms for each ego network are visualized equally. 
Each sociogram reflects node size for centrality nodes of authorities. The color of the nodes 
is based on Newman grouping. The strength value of the ties between nodes are reflected in 
the width of the tie. The main node of each network uses the logo for the node image. Hubs 
are also reflected with the Twitter image of the node although the ego’s node is represented 
by the media organization’s emblem. 
Some nodes are algorithmically more central within each of the subgroups, and some 
have also been previously recognized previously in research, such as RenieriArts.158 
However, other hubs such as VeraVanHorne and RALee85, appear to have a high number of 
followers and are very vocal within the OSN. However, these two nodes are in major contrast 
                                                 
158 @DFRLab, “#TrollTracker: From Tags to Trolling, How Tweets to a Small Group Precede 
Attacks on Critics of the Syrian and Russian Regimes,” Medium, June 27, 2018, https://medium.com/
dfrlab/trolltracker-from-tags-to-trolling-58bb2ef87acd. 
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as to the content they each provide. For example, VeraVanHorne espouses RT media and pro-
Russian content while RALee85 disseminates insider information about Russian defense 
policy, weapons, and warfare.  
 
Figure 11. RT_com Ego Network ORA Visualization  
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Figure 14. TASSagency_en Ego Network ORA Visualization 
The visualizations provide further understanding of the number and density of the 
ego networks, the various participating groups illustrated by color, and the strength 
between some specific nodes as represented by the line (tie) width between nodes. These 
four ego networks also reflect that followers, nodes, will not always follow the same or all 
existing Russian media. However, this narrow focus on four ego networks of various 
Russian state-affiliated media do not represent possible trends of all Russian media. Further 
analysis would be worthwhile by extracting the ego nodes and determining further central 
figures within the network. This ego network analysis is merely a snapshot of the more 
significant outlets which aim to influence U.S. audiences publicly. 
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C. SOCIAL MEDIA: A CRITICAL COMPONENT TO THE RUSSIAN 
REGIME’S MODUS OPERANDI 
With the overall popularity of Twitter among educated groups and diverse use by 
people around the world,159 this open-source online social network (OSN) provides an 
arena for scholarly research and strategic consideration of the dissemination of Russian 
propaganda and online active measures. Zachary Steinhert-Threlkeld points out Twitter’s 
use by academics, with 80% of users having earned a college degree, an income over $50k 
a year, with 42% as daily users and 24% as weekly users.160 According to experts, Twitter 
accurately reflects the social network construct of nodes’ offline behavior within 
networks.161 In other words, a person’s behavior on Twitter is likely to reflect similar 
relationships, weak or strong, within the person’s actual life.162 Further, it likely reflects 
the conventional media and friends that the node interacts with or observes outside of 
Twitter. Nancy Baym points out that social media provides an extension to one’s life, yet 
it also provides a path of new social norms and allowable fantasy projection.163 The 
opportunity can then be used for good or ill, such as what we witness in Russia’s use of 
coordinators, trolls, media co-opters.164 Approximately 8% of tweets are from news outlets 
although up to 15% of topics originate from news outlets.165 Therefore, those statistics 
potentially relate to the percentage of tweets derived from Russian news broadcast nodes 
and the topics on which their ego-centric networks diffuse information. 
During the 2016 U.S. elections, Russia’s Internet Research Agency (IRA) used two 
strategies through Twitter: operating individual Twitter accounts to falsely represent U.S. 
                                                 
159 Zachary C. Steinert-Threlkeld, Twitter as Data (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 
4, https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108529327. 
160 Shannon Greenwood, Andrew Perrin, and Maeve Duggan, “Social Media Update 2016,” PEW 
Research Center, November 11, 2016, https://www.pewinternet.org/2016/11/11/social-media-update-2016/. 
161 R. I. M. Dunbar et al., “The Structure of Online Social Networks Mirrors Those in the Offline 
World,” Social Networks 43 (October 2015): 39–47, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socnet.2015.04.005. 
162 Dunbar et al., “The Structure of Online Social Networks.” 
163 Baym, Personal Connections. 
164 Helmus et al., Russian Social Media Influence. 
165 Momin M. Malik and Jürgen Pfeffer, “A Macroscopic Analysis of News Content in Twitter,” 
Digital Journalism 4, no. 8 (February 2016): 955–79, https://doi.org/10.1080/21670811.2015.1133249. 
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persons and operating automated bot networks.166 The accounts would then disseminate 
original content by direct messaging and open-source posting.167 During January 2018, 
Twitter identified 3,814 IRA-affiliated accounts that had disseminated 8.4% of 175,993 
tweets relating to the 2016 elections.168 In fact, Twitter also notified roughly 1.4 million 
people who had contact with IRA-controlled accounts.169 According to Special Counsel 
Robert S. Mueller, III, in his report, 
on February 16, 2018, a federal grand jury in the District of Columbia 
returned an indictment charging 13 Russian nationals and three Russian 
entities—including the Internet Research Agency (IRA) and Concord 
Management and Consulting LLC (Concord)—with violating U.S. criminal 
laws in order to interfere with U.S. elections and political processes.170 
Although scholars, investigators, and politicians are all trying to determine Russia’s 
effectiveness with elections meddling, the abovementioned indictment by the United States 
FBI clearly provides federal recognition of Russia’s potential to have impact through direct 
interference using social media. In the next sections, the thesis further explains how the 
IRA directly encouraged political activity through advertisement and social engineering as 
described within the indictment, while relating it to the current Twitter activity described 
in this research. 
D. ADVERTISEMENT: THE UNRESTRICTED WEAPON TO INFLUENCE 
OSN 
The Russian regime has proved its ability to employ assets and resources to harness 
the opportunity of advertising within OSN.171 The 2016 U.S. elections illuminated 
Russia’s Facebook advertising campaign, funded by approximately $46,000, to influence 
                                                 
166 Special Counsel Robert S. Mueller, III, Report on the Investigation into Russian Interference in 
the 2016 Presidential Election Volume I of II (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, March 2019): 
26, https://www.justice.gov/storage/report.pdf. 
167 Mueller, 27. 
168 Mueller, 28. 
169 Mueller, 28. 
170 Mueller, 174. 
171 Mueller, 174. 
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up to 150 million Americans.172 This monetary figure was revealed by Vice President and 
General Counsel of Facebook, Colin Stretch, during a testimony in 2017 to the U.S. Senate 
Select Committee on Intelligence.173 However, this monetary figure may not fully 
represent unknown advertising efforts directed by the IRA. Advanced Persistent Threat 
(APT) 28 was deemed responsible in these cyber operations and skillfully took advantage 
of opportunity by purchasing thousands of advertisements that targeted varying 
demographics. APT 28 is a known cyber group affiliated with the GRU and is deemed 
responsible for the U.S. 2016 elections hacking.174 The IRA also sent spearfishing emails 
to public officials and individuals affiliated with voting technology.175 Considering this 
technique in advancing their political goals, the Russian government apparently realizes 
the potential to further influence audiences with paid advertisements, further instilling fear 
and garnering support for their objectives. On August 19, 2019, Twitter stated it “will not 
accept advertising from state-controlled news media entities... that are either financially or 
editorially controlled by the state”; however, this does not address cover platforms or third-
party proxy companies advertising in the interest of the state,176 and the IRA has 
previously contracted third-party companies for advertisement during the 2016 U.S. 
elections. 
The advertisement in Figure 15, self-identifying as “Democrat Indians” in what 
seems to be an India-affiliated website, surfaced during a search on the Status-6 and 
provides a link for individuals to gain additional knowledge about the Status-6. The 
website, theindiansubcontinent.com, provides conspiratorial information about various 
                                                 
172 Hearing on Social Media Influence in the 2016 United States Presidential Elections before the 
House Select Committee on Intelligence, House, 115th Cong., 1st sess., November 1, 2017, 
https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/os-cstretch-110117.pdf.; Farhad Manjoo, 
“Tackling the Internet’s Central Villain: The Advertising Business,” New York Times, January 31, 2018, 
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175 Mueller, Report on the Investigation into Russian Interference I, 51. 
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https://blog.twitter.com/en_us/topics/company/2019/advertising_policies_on_state_media.html. 
57 
topics, including the Status-6 weapon and its claimed catastrophic effects. The unsecure 
website also provides further information on other conspiratorial topics. The website is 
registered through name.com, resulting in few ownership details within whois.net 
registration results. However, it does reflect a registration date of October 22, 2012. 
Furthermore, a third-party application, Ecroaker Master, was the platform used to 
propagate the tweet.177 If Ecroaker Master is affiliated with Ecroaker.com, it is further a 
subsidiary of IntelligentTriangle, a third-party application based in Bangalore, India. 
Ecroaker identifies as an entertainment, consulting, and information technology business. 
This company also has applications available for download from GooglePlay and has a 
Facebook page.178 India not only hosts advertisement efforts, but it is potentially a victim 
of the recent data privacy breach. India is referenced in the recent Cambridge Analytica 
(CA) data breach; evidence of recent testimonies suggests the parent company of CA, 
Strategic Communications Limited (SCL), were also involved in recent Indian 
elections.179 
The United States’ weak regulation of the advertising industry, the increasing 
advancement of technology, and powerful social media companies provide massive 
opportunity to other nation-states to inexpensively leverage opportunity from across the 
world while enabling a sense of plausible deniability. Russia’s advertising during the U.S. 
elections was hardly known to the common person and took major governmental effort and 
the keen insights of cyber-security companies to determine the Russian regime’s 
involvement. A recent study released by Carl T. Bergstrom and Joseph B. Bak-Coleman 
reveals the concept of Stewart’s et al. “information gerrymandering,” in which: 
an analysis shows that information flow between individuals in a social 
network can be ‘gerrymandered’ to skew perceptions of how others in the 
                                                 
177 DemocratIndians (@Democratindians), “Check out who is Trending the hashtag Статус-6 and 
why,” Twitter, November 11, 2015, 9:07 p.m., https://twitter.com/DemocratIndians/status/
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community will vote — which can alter the outcomes of elections... In 
geographical gerrymandering, the borders of voting districts are drawn so 
as to concentrate voters from the opposition party into one or a few districts, 
leaving the voters for the gerrymandering party in a numerical majority 
elsewhere. In information gerrymandering, the way in which voters are 
concentrated into districts is not what matters; rather, it is the way in which 
the connections between them are arranged. Nevertheless, like geographical 
gerrymandering, information gerrymandering threatens ideas about 
proportional representation in a democracy.180 
The authors further point out the effects of website technology and micro-targeted 
political advertising, which also became apparent during this research. Dipayan Ghosh and 
Ben Scott recently wrote the Digital Deceit: The Technologies Behind Precision 
Propaganda on the Internet.181 Ghosh and Scott explain the negative impacts of present-
day methods in online advertising that include behavioral data tracking, online ad buying, 
search engine optimization (SEO), social media management services (SMMS), and 
artificial intelligence in marketing.182 The effects can include but are not limited to privacy 
interference, money loss, or social polarization. Although one’s online pattern can have 
positive outcomes in one’s life, such as recommending vacation spots or the next best pair 
of shoes, multiple pitfalls indicate a need for improved understanding. Phones are tracked 
by satellites, further enabling detailed tracking of one’s location and activity, despite some 
individually enabled phone-sharing restrictions. “Disinformation operators”183 can 
interfere with what you see within your social media feed, prioritizing advertisement. 
Furthermore, click-bait from unregulated advertisements can lead to computer network 
attacks, such as planting viruses or web cookies from websites and related third-parties. 
One may think an online anonymizer or virtual private network will protect from such 
advertisement, but today’s methods still allow ample opportunities. Social media accounts 
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often owned by just a few major companies can enable the data generated by the person’s 
application use to drive the advertisement. Perhaps one’s internet protocol address is from 
across the world, but your activity related to your specific account gives all the data needed 
to generate precise targeting. The U.S. government is slow and unlikely to agree to or pass 
bills on the topic, including the H.R. 896: Fairness in Political Advertising Act of 2019.184 
Figure 14 is an advertisement for the Status-6 as a topic to be further explored in 
an Indian-affiliated website. This advertisement targets inquiry of the search term Status-
6. I strongly advise against visiting this website based on security risks. 
 
Figure 15. Advertisement for the Status-6 Nuclear Weapon185  
E. FROM OSN TO PHYSICAL MOBILIZATION 
Previous chapters focused on the media, methods of dissemination, and networks, 
but the opportunity also exists for audiences to mobilize or further engage in the physical 
world. As previously discussed in Chapter II, non-government organizations, including the 
WPC and USPC, were successful with disseminating information and rallying support with 
little funding compared to major government organizations. Chapter IV, this current 
chapter, discussed some of the basic social network structures of the Russian media’s 
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online networks and ego networks and the relations within the OSN. These networks can 
also be considered in a relational sense within social movement theory.186 In fact, the 
Mueller report confirms IRA’s purchase of online advertisements to promote IRA-
organized U.S. rallies.187 IRA nodes (personas) announced and promoted the events, both 
broadly and via direct message. The IRA node would then tell one of the potential rally 
recruits that the node couldn’t attend and needed the recruit to serve as the coordinator on 
the ground at the rally.188 Further photos and videos from the event were posted on the 
IRA’s accounts.189 Besides promoting rallies, the IRA also funded and hired a self-defense 
instructor to teach any OSN recruits following an IRA-node (persona) called the “Black 
Fist,” an account amplifying black social activism.190 The IRA also recruited U.S. persons 
to act as spokespeople and to amplify IRA-generated content, treating these individuals as 
tasked agents, tracking their activities.191 This 2016 IRA-induced elections activity 
represents an opportunity for the IRA’s ability to initiate disarmament, pro-Russian, or 
anti-West protests and rallies against U.S. nuclear armament and nuclear policy. The 
success of historic Freeze groups proved successful in rallying over these same topics and 
should be considered in today’s security environment. 
Returning to the concept of netwar, Arquilla and Ronfeldt stated, in 2001, that 
“Case studies and an Internet activist survey indicate that the Internet, including electronic 
mail, the web, and its other facets, gives grassroots groups an important new tool for 
attempting to foster political change.”192 The discourse of existing grassroots groups could 
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achieve increased media attention and increased connectivity from outside actors with the 
means, such as funding and media processes, to do so. In today’s information age, even a 
smartphone video can be reformatted to fit a media outlet’s information objectives. During 
recent indictments of Russian agents and Maria Butina’s integration into the National Rifle 
Association (NRA),193 key indicators imply the possibility of further integration of 
Russian agents into the social media groups of the U.S. military-industrial complex that 
study, work, write policy, and engage in the discourse on nuclear weapons. In fact, both 
the Russian and U.S. nuclear weapons and related armament industrial complexes are 
subjects of the Russian media Twitter network. Russian companies within the network 
include but are not limited to Rostec and Rosatom, the two largest and best-known 
companies in this field. 
Zúñiga, Jung, and Valenzuela pointed out in 2012 that “after controlling for 
demographic variables, traditional media use offline and online, political constructs 
(knowledge and efficacy), and frequency and size of political discussion networks, seeking 
information via social network sites is a positive and significant predictor of people’s social 
capital and civic and political participatory behaviors, online and offline.”194 According to 
a 2019 investigation, the IRA initiated a large-scale development of social media groups 
in early 2015 that falsely claimed affiliation with U.S. political organizations.195 During 
the 2016 U.S. elections, Russia demonstrated its ability for trolls to mobilize groups of 
people for political protest.196 Twitter accounts including @March_for_Trump, a Russian-
linked account, successfully organized pro-Trump rallies. Another Russian initiated group 
called “United Muslims of America” was used for pro-Hillary protests as the Russians 
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simultaneously paid one of the protestors to hold a sign at the protest stating “I think Sharia 
Law will be a powerful new direction of freedom.” The Mueller team’s indictments reflect 
at least another half-dozen instances of Russian social media actors successfully 
encouraging protest during the elections for divisive results. Russia also rallied people 
using social media during the attempted coups of President Erdogan, and conjured protests 
over nuclear weapons and the weapons’ locations.  
In 1998, Jeffrey Knopf’s mixed-methods research concluded that there has been at 
times a significant impact of societal activism on arms control and disarmament within the 
U.S.197 However, Knopf does not address two key accelerating factors in today’s 
revolution in information warfare: the advantages of speed and brand access provided by 
social media platforms. Knopf found that an influencer can use his or her full-advantage of 
opportunity to impact arms policy by integrating and maximizing within the three clear and 
established processes in American politics: “(1) mobilizing public opinion to exert electoral 
pressure (2) working with sympathetic political elites to alter the amount of support for the 
President’s policy in Congress, and (3) generating ideas that have utility for agencies in the 
executive.”198 Today’s Global Zero movement, a modern international anti-nuclear 
weapons group, has over 70 elites representing North America that are tied to civic, 
military, and political communities.199 Dozens of other active groups engage in anti-
nuclear weapons communication, policy writing, and protests. This form of activism is not 
indicative of Russia’s influence operations, but provides opportunity for human 
engagement and influence by means of social media. In fact, many of these groups, 
including but not limited to Human Rights Watch, Ban Killer Robots, Global Zero, 
Ministry4Disarmament, and the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, a 
Nobel Peace Prize winning group, are discussed and highlighted within the Russian media 
Twitter network. Russia has opportunity in three distinct ways: rallying action of various 
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primary audiences of weapons-related groups and key leaders to change U.S. nuclear 
policy; inciting chaos within civil and military environments to decrease trust in the U.S. 
government; and trying to influence secondary audiences in an attempt to influence U.S. 
policy. Over the past three decades, scholars have grappled with the CNN Effect, the ability 
of media to shape policymakers’ perspectives and actions, yet its direct application to 
nuclear security strategy has yet to be fully addressed.200 
In consideration of political process theory, Russia acts as an external elite and 
movement entrepreneur that uses media in efforts to spark collective action supporting its 
goals.201 This thesis considers political process theory in understanding this network 
because Russia’s state-sponsored media construct can and chooses to use resources and 
influential people to gain social support and access, which play a major role in contentious 
politics. Previously, this thesis discussed Russia’s media as a dependent variable also 
reliant on the Russian regime’s intent to achieve power and persuasion on the global stage. 
The application of political process theory is no different and reflects the Russian media 
network as a dependent variable as well. Both Gamson and Goldstone debate the factors 
that influence social movement success.202  
However, in the case of Russia’s attempts to gain power and influence via social 
media, both theorists’ contributions serve as a foundation. Goldstone argues that “national 
political or economic crises” contribute to favorable political social movements while 
Gamson argued that more organized and centralized social movements will succeed.203 
However, if we consider deliberate intervention of a state-actor, such as Russia, using well-
organized social movement organizations (SMO) during national political crises, real or 
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perceived, then perhaps both theorists’ ideas apply to Russia’s influence attempts aimed at 
current U.S. policy circles. Nuclear weapons groups and collective groups of concerned 
citizens during crises might also have increased ability to shape the public discourse. RT 
and Sputnik have previously tweeted false information about bombs exploding within 
Paris, a possible attempt to create civil unrest.204 Kitschelt’s 1986 research reflects that 
open societies, such as the United States, provide even more opportunity for social 
movements.205 The open society, contrary to Russia’s partially closed society, provides 
further opportunity for attempts to achieve some degree of social influence. 
The suspension of the INF Treaty, the increase in civil polarization, the increase of 
power and unregulated internet environment and related companies, U.S. difficulty in 
labeling Russia as an enemy, the turmoil that results from the two-party system, and the 
contention within the U.S. government writ large all pose as clear examples within 
Tarrow’s and Tilly’s political opportunity framework.206 The below chart reflects the 
political opportunity structure, verbatim: 
• the multiplicity of independent centers of power within the regime; 
• its relative closure or openness to new actors; 
• the instability or stability of current political alignments; 
• the availability of influential allies or supporters; 
• the extent to which the regime represses or facilitates collective 
claim making; 
• decisive changes in these properties.207 
 
F. CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
This chapter revealed the most-linked nodes that, in various ways, espouse Russian 
media content along with the densest network. Furthermore, this chapter discussed the 
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potential, based on recent evidence during the 2016 elections, for the OSN to enable 
political activity and to set media conditions for the benefit of accomplishing Russian 
government political aims. Chapter V presents the findings as considered theoretically and 
in consideration of Russia’s doctrine and ongoing strategy. 
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V. RUSSIA’S INFORMATION STRATEGY 
The thesis’s previous chapters provided some historical background on the Soviet 
and Russian information strategy and tactics while also providing analytical insight into 
Russia’s current efforts with social media and other means of content diffusion. Building 
on that work, Chapter V specifically applies that evidence to RF’s nuclear security strategy. 
The Russian regime is relying on a show of force in the media in efforts to deter and 
influence the West, setting advantageous conditions for its policies. In a Machiavellian 
sense, Russia’s attempts seem designed to convince the West and others that the cost of 
any war with Russia would be too high. Furthermore, the Russian regime aims to gain 
credibility as a global superpower while discrediting the West. 
The Russian regime is using strategic weapons media content in striving to 
influence and deceive audiences, increasing fear and developing regime power. Robert Art 
describes such behavior as “swaggering” and as “ill-defined” and as a state’s effort to 
increase prestige and power. This is usually expressed in two ways: “displaying one’s 
military might at military exercises and national demonstrations and buying or building the 
era’s most prestigious weapons.”208 He further notes this behavior is not “undertaken 
solely or even primarily” to enhance “defense, deterrent, and compellent capabilities,” but 
also as a low-cost method to increase prestige. Access to today’s media and advertisement 
is cheap and enables such behavior as a way to influence a broad spectrum of audiences. 
Media “swagger” can also be undertaken over the long-term, as a part of “reflexive 
control,” such as how Russia shifted its release of information about the Status-6 weapon 
over a four-year period. Robert Art further describes the use of the irrational and rational 
perceptions of military power, a method inherently visible in Russia’s strategic weapons 
messaging.209 
                                                 




The Status-6 is a weapon that is claimed, incredibly, to have the ability to destroy 
the entire U.S. Eastern coast with its large-scale load of multiple torpedoes amounting to 
over 200 nuclear megatons. This weapon clearly demonstrates a blend of both the rational 
and irrational. The fear of nuclear weapons further demonstrates the potential 
psychological impact. Over the past four decades, the American public has largely lost its 
familiarity with and understanding of nuclear weapons, exposing a significant U.S. 
vulnerability. 
A strategy comprised of large-scale media efforts, including unfounded claims and 
deception, lends to a wide-reaching and potentially influential strategy to gain political 
support from civil populations and key leaders while ultimately influencing foreign policy. 
President Putin’s strategy can, therefore, be viewed, on a continuum over long periods of 
time, regardless of major shifts in nuclear or defense strategy, as an attempt to set favorable 
political conditions while using specific methods of deterrence or coercion to further gain 
ground on political goals. Contrary to Art, this thesis argues that, in this continuum, 
Russia’s secondary audiences and primary audiences, not restricted to audiences of the 
West, are critical extensions of political targets. These audiences pose further opportunities 
for influence in line with the Russian regime’s political goals. Furthermore, this media 
strategy provides a predictable environment for illustrating ally cooperation, such as 
India’s Prime Minister’s support of Russian policy, as another method of demonstrating 
credibility to its audiences.  
Chapter V theorizes the prestige and preservation of Russia’s regime, psychological 
warfare, and informational deterrence as it relates to the research of this thesis. 
A. PRESTIGE AND PRESERVATION OF THE REGIME 
President Putin and his close circle apparently desire to keep control over the 
government and further do so by extending their power and control into the media and the 
Internet. President Putin emerged from a long career in the former KGB to take over the 
presidency in 1999. He was appointed president by the previous president, Boris Yeltsin 
and has stated numerous times that he desires to reverse the fall of the Soviet Union. He 
recently won a majority vote of over 76%, thus reaffirming his presidency. It is likely that 
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his regime will aim to continue the status quo of President Putin beyond 2024, regardless 
of economic costs.210 President Putin’s desire to maintain prestige and continuing control 
of the government is reflected by the nation’s key policy decisions. Security conditions are 
prioritized over the economy, which is already suffering after sanctions by the United 
States and its allies. In March 2018, Putin stated that, if he could change any one thing of 
the past, he would “reverse the collapse of the Soviet Union.”211 He obviously wants 
Russia to be a leading power in a multipolar world and also sees the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) as a threat to his ability to reach this goal. He emphasizes expanding 
Russian influence in the near-abroad, a process he started in 2008 with seizure of an 
Ossetian enclave in Georgia. President Putin has also maintained a sphere of influence 
within other former Soviet territories through long-term mass communication aimed at 
ethnic Russian audiences, providing essential services, and spreading propaganda that 
paints a patriotic picture of Russia.212 
Russia’s military is strong, regardless of sanctions on the economy. Russia 
regularly flexes its muscles around its borders, conducts large-scale military exercises with 
China and other partners, and has a far-reaching network of spies, criminals, and special 
operations personnel able to act quickly in Russia’s interests.213 In 2000, former Russian 
Intelligence Agent, Colonel Stanivlav Lunev, warned the U.S. government during 
testimony before Congress: “I can say to you very openly and very firmly that Russian 
intelligence activity against the United States is much more active than it was in the time 
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of the former Soviet Union’s existence. It’s more active today than it was then.”214 Most 
importantly, Russia’s cyber warfare capabilities are highly evolved in terms of both 
offensive and defensive operations.  
President Putin’s IRA wages battles across a full spectrum, as previously 
mentioned, in the informational, psychological, and digital-technological domains.215 In 
2017, Putin hinted that “patriotically minded” hackers could have been responsible for the 
attacks during the elections on the Democratic National Committee: “If they are 
patriotically minded, they start making their contributions — which are right, from their 
point of view — to the fight against those who say bad things about Russia;” hacktivists 
have gained a reputation in light of activities of Anonymous, and sympathizers of the 
Russian government could be no different.216 Russia’s Federal Security Service recruits 
hackers and then threatens them with jail unless they choose to serve Russia with their 
skills.217 Students and private individuals are often required to fulfill a mandatory military 
service obligation.218 The Russian Business Network (RBN) functions as the internet 
complex for service, tools, and programs in Russia.219 
B. PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE 
In 2000, the United States received warning in testimony of the Russian spy 
network and its potential to conduct psychological warfare against the United States. The 
recent decade represents the fruition of the psychological warfare warned as Russia 
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strengthens and diversifies its ability to achieve influence of the United States and the West. 
Below is an exert from a Russian journal referenced during the testimony. 
In 1995, a Russian author published an article in a Russian-Federation-sponsored 
military journal and was later used in a testimony in 2000 about the Russian threats to the 
United States: 
Psychological special operations, which aim to change in the requisite 
direction the emotional attitudes and behavior patterns of enemy 
(designated country or area) military servicemen or civilian population on 
certain military-political and other matters as well as to counter propaganda 
by the opposing side among own troops and civilians. The type of operation 
consists of demoralizing and confusing the enemy (armed formations) 
personnel, persuading it to stop resistance, to desert, surrender, and support 
opposition political activity; and shaping a favorable attitude toward the 
Russian army among the local population.220 
 
This thesis defines psychological warfare as efforts to use information to influence 
audiences, which, as this thesis has previously described, Russia has used previously. The 
Russians have always deliberately used, and often excelled at, psychological warfare.221 
The thesis further considers reflexive control222 and deception as subcategories of 
psychological warfare, focused on enemy leaders.  
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Throughout the Soviet era and in more recent Russian history, maskirovka, also 
known as strategic deception, is another instrument of information strategy, at which the 
Russians have excelled.223 The Russians have long used such tactics. For example, see the 
false AIDs narrative224 and various other stories aimed at winning the narrative war as 
discussed in the previous chapters. The current Russian regime uses deception, 
psychological operations, and coordinated media strategy in diverse ways in pursuit of its 
objectives although the specific methodology is very dependent on the objectives at hand. 
The strategic use of deception and influence, as described by Sun Tzu as “all warfare is 
based on deception,” “to subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of the skill” and 
“a victorious army wins its victories before seeking battle,”225 can help us understand 
Russia’s prioritized use of such strategy. 
Michael Mihalka previously published on Soviet strategic deception and the 
required comparison and use within the Soviets’ posture regarding strategic weapons.226 
In fact, Mihalka warned us during the 1980s “War Scare’ of the Soviets” opportunity to 
disrupt the American political process.227 The regime is likely still using deception to hide 
its intent within the nuclear policy realm, as it does with other political aims.228 The 
Russian regime likely knows that the deceptions illustrated within media, both known state- 
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media and plausibly deniable third-party media, can be difficult for the West to counter 
and verify. 
The Russian government is actively using social media in efforts to influence 
audiences and decisionmakers as a way to deter and coerce Western leaders and to foster 
political change conducive to Russian security objectives. As discussed in previous 
chapters, the Soviet government used and the Russian government uses media in efforts to 
advance security objectives and capitalize on populations and opportunity within its 
overarching strategy.  
In 1993, Arquilla and Ronfeldt also warned of a transition, a military technical 
revolution, in which “the future of war—specifically the U.S. ability to anticipate and wage 
war—will be shaped in part by how these technological advances are assessed and 
adopted.” These gentlemen even argued that technology can have a significant impact on 
ways of societal thinking and the efficiency of various activities.229 This mode of thinking 
can be applied to nuclear warfare in concert with information operations, both of the 
Russian Federation and the United States. Although they do not specifically name the 
Russian Federation in consideration of nuclear war, one could consider Russia’s ongoing 
New Generation Warfare (NGW) and use of information operations as a blend of netwar 
and cyberwar. As Arquilla and Ronfeldt state, “while both netwar and cyberwar revolve 
around information and communications matters, at a deeper level they are forms of war 
about ‘knowledge’—about who knows what, when, where, and why, and about how secure 
a society or a military is regarding its knowledge of itself and its adversaries.”230 They 
deliberately address nuclear warfare, but do not directly illustrate the potential use of 
netwar and cyberwar in a formal nation-state nuclear warfare strategy, including protracted 
and conventional.231 In a nuclear netwar and cyberwar, Russia’s opportunity exists to 
empower anti-nuclear weapon groups protesting for disarmament. In 2018, RAND 
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published findings that provide evidence of the Russian use of propaganda and pro-Russian 
and anti-Russian communities on Twitter attempting to achieve political objectives.232 The 
United States’ recent discontinuation of the INF Treaty flags further concerns from 
scholars and policymakers about a new nuclear arms race and new war scare.233  
Russia’s use of social media, including the use of bots and trolls, is an example of 
Russia’s method to disorient U.S. institutions and societies, while also discrediting the U.S. 
and West. In Arquilla’s and Ronfeldt’s, Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, 
Crime, and Militancy, they addressed concerns of “soft power,” “knowledge,” 
“information operations,” “perception management” and its relation to media-oriented 
measures “that aim to attract or disorient rather than coerce, and that affect how secure a 
society, a military, or other actor feels about its knowledge of itself and of its adversaries. 
Psychological disruption may become as important a goal as physical destruction.”234 This 
thesis also provides statistics reflecting the ongoing activities of Russian media and the 
discourse generated within social media, while also confirming potential grave effects if 
not further recognized and analyzed.  
Even after a blatant warning from scholars such as Arquilla and Ronfeldt, RAND 
points out that the United States still does not properly tell the U.S. story, does not provide 
adequate content, and is not properly analyzing or tracking Russian social media efforts.235 
Arquilla and Ronfeldt speak only in direct terms of nation-state cyberwar: “Nuclear 
counterforce strategies were very much interested in destroying the key communications 
centers of the opponent, thereby making it impossible for him to command and control far 
flung nuclear weapons.” Although the interpretation of this seems to be focused on hard 
infrastructure destruction, it could be farther considered in terms of propaganda. If a nation-
state, such as the United States, fails to not only understand existing hard-wire networks 
and networked access [social groups] by technical pathways to human audiences with 
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semiotics, social networks, and communication methods, how can it win a net-cyberwar? 
Mostly, they reference terrorist use, but, in today’s environment, we can likely see that 
Russia’s proxies, mafia, internet agency, intelligence and security organizations have 
similar capabilities.  
Dima Adamsky, Ulrich Kühn, and Kristin Ven Bruusgaard provide a clear 
description of Russia’s information warfare and New Generation Warfare (NGW), which 
includes non-nuclear deterrence and informational deterrence as inseparable from its 
nuclear aspirations and development.236 Adamsky, in his systematic piece on Cross-
domain Coercion, best details this: “Russia’s NGW efforts, the ‘informational- 
psychological struggle’ is the initial main effort, as the ‘moral-psychological-cognitive-
informational suppression of the adversary’s decision-makers and operators assures 
conditions for achieving victory.” Adamsky also states that “asymmetrical and indirect 
actions of political, economic, informational, and technological nature neutralize the 
adversary’s military superiority,” and “indirect strategy in its current technological look” 
is founded using “informational struggle to counterbalance the adversary with or without 
minimal employment of military force, mainly through informational superiority, in all 
domains.”237 The “Information Struggle,” “aimed at achieving this superiority, blurs war 
and peace, front and rear, levels of war (tactical, operational, and strategic), forms of 
warfare (offense and defense), and forms of coercion (deterrence and compellence).”238 
Adamsky further states that “the use of cyber is defined by Russia as cybernetics, including 
both digital-technological and cognitive-psychological domains and is an integral part of 
the broader informational environment.”239 The thesis also considers Adamsky’s 
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sociological, psychological, and cognitive tactics and methods targeting the populace and 
ultimately U.S. decision makers as mentioned previously.240 
The International Security and Defense Policy Center of the RAND National 
Defense Research Institute conducted research sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense’s Rapid Reaction Technology Office. Findings indicate that the RF uses 
conventional and social media in a synchronized manner in effects to influence internal 
and external audiences to achieve its political objectives and to create unrest within 
adversarial nation-states.241 RAND studied Russian-language social media content and 
networks within the near-abroad populations and provided policy recommendations. 
Although RAND’s study brings attention to Russia’s use of social media to stoke fresh fear 
of nuclear war and use of Twitter to give false locations of nuclear weapons, it does not 
specifically address Russia’s direct targeting of U.S. populations, including government or 
influential nuclear-related policy groups on social media.242 
As witnessed in this research, the Russian government capitalizes on the 
sociological, psychological, and cognitive tactics and methods targeting susceptible 
internet audiences and ultimately U.S. decision makers as mentioned previously by 
Adamsky.243  
C. INFORMATIONAL DETERRENCE, INFORMATSIONNOE 
SDERZHIVANIE 
The use of cyber is defined by Russia as “cybernetics,” or kibernetika, including 
both digital-technological and cognitive-psychological domains and is an integral part of 
the broader informational environment.244 Also, according to Adamsky, in Russia’s NGW 
efforts, 
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the “informational-psychological struggle” first takes a leading role, as the 
moral-psychological-cognitive-informational suppression of the 
adversary’s decision-makers and operators assures conditions for achieving 
victory. Second, asymmetrical and indirect actions of political, economic, 
informational, and “technical nature neutralize the adversary’s military 
superiority. “Indirect strategy in its current technological look” is primarily 
about using informational struggle to neutralize the adversary without, or 
with minimal, employment of military force, mainly through informational 
superiority (both digital-technical and cognitive-psychological). Third, the 
complex of non-military actions downgrades the adversary’s ability to 
compel or to employ force, and produces a negative image in the world 
public opinion that eventually dissuades the adversary from initiating 
aggression. Fourth, the side initiating NGW employs a massive deception 
and disinformation campaign (along the lines of the traditional strategic-
operational maskirovka concept) to conceal the time, scope, scale, and the 
character of the attack. Fifth, the subversion-reconnaissance activities 
conducted by special operations, covered by informational operations, 
precede the kinetic phase of the campaign. Sixth, the kinetic phase starts 
with space-aerial dominance aimed at destroying critical assets of civilian 
industrial-technological infrastructure and centers of state and military 
management that will force the state to capitulate. Operating under no-fly 
zones (along lines of anti-access/ area denial principles), private military 
companies and armed opposition prepare an operational setup for invasion. 
Seventh, by the phase of the territorial occupation, most of the campaign 
goals have been achieved, as the ability and will of the adversary to resist 
have been broken and have evaporated.245 
Worth repeating, the “Information Struggle” is “aimed at achieving this superiority, blurs 
war and peace, front and rear, levels of war (tactical, operational, and strategic), forms of 
warfare (offense and defense), and forms of coercion (deterrence and compellence).”246 
D. CHAPTER CONCLUSION 
Most importantly, this thesis describes how the Russian government can use a 
media strategy to shape long-term favorable conditions in the realm of societal perceptions 
of nuclear weapons to achieve security objectives. This chapter described existing theory 
on Russian deception, informational deterrence, coercion, and psychological warfare as a 
part of media strategy and as it relates to the findings within the overall research of this 




thesis. Even after the stark warning in the year 2000 and other warnings from scholars and 
theorists, social media platforms have served and are continuing to serve as both battlefield 
and domain for Russian operations. Media, and social media by extension, enable Russia 
to use messaging and psychological warfare to advance its narrative and shape the global 
environment in favor of its security strategy in support of its political aims. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
“Does Russia’s use of social media influence the American public discourse on nuclear 
weapons?” This thesis shows that, yes, many groups described within the SNA chapter are 
reactive to the content. However, this is measured only by the existing reactions within Twitter 
and within the OSN, while also considering the reaction from U.S. media and reactive policy 
statements of the U.S. government. This research does not find that Russian media is 
successfully influencing and persuading U.S. audiences to believe Russian content. The 
indictment for the elections meddling described needed evidence that Russian messaging not 
only encourages American discourse, but also leads to protests as described during 2016 
elections. Various U.S. audiences share and retweet Russian media about strategic nuclear 
weapons, whether supporting and believing in it or in defiance and as an effort to discredit.  
This thesis illuminates how the Russian social media network has shaped discourse 
and content on the Status-6 and the INF Treaty, connecting those efforts to Russia’s 
information strategy in support of their nuclear security objectives. Russia’s cooperation 
with Indian media outlets permeates the Twitter network in English language as a display 
of support among top leaders of India and Russia. The research also highlights a small 
portion of a long-term media dissemination campaign orchestrated by Russia’s officials 
with the willing support of Russian and international media entities.  
Further research would be useful to determine the discourse around U.S. strategic 
weapons to determine if a network exists that reflects anti-war, anti-weapon, or anti-West 
sentiment generated by Russian media. The overall research advances our understanding 
of the uses of social media for strategic objectives and how such activities should inform 
U.S. strategic policy perspectives on the topic of Russian strategic weapons. 
Although the researcher used qualitative research by viewing homepages, 
timelines, books, and related internet material about the hubs, not all actors within the 
network were closely analyzed. Semiotic analysis and a full knowledge of the actors’ posts, 
and perhaps how their habits have shifted over time, is worth consideration. Another step 
for additional research would be to distinguish bots and personas from real U.S. persons. 
The researcher relied on node self-identification and deemed credibility from other 
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published research sources. However, further considerations could determine the 
authenticity and true identities of the nodes. In today’s society, the use of virtual private 
networks (VPN), virtual systems, spoofed internet protocol (IP) addresses, and spoofed 
hardware identification can allow social media to be a playing field for anyone around the 
world. We have seen in the most recent elections meddling and hacking the OPCW an 
example.247 RF’s Internet Research Agency (IRA) enabled teams, inside Russia and even 
marketing teams within the United States, to conduct their work with millions of 
Twitterbots. Could IntelligentTriangle and website advertisements like DemocractIndians, 
as mentioned previously, be Russia or another actor’s effort to leverage the Twitter 
algorithm for viral sharing of deceptive content with plausible deniability? Yes, and this 
use of marketing is a method to focus targeting audiences, particularly for surgical 
engagement to describe and provide a narrative. While Operation Infektion was illuminated 
by the USG, further research could consider to what extent India and other countries are 
willingly or otherwise enabling Russia’s media sharing via social media today. It would be 
in the interest of the United States and the international community to investigate and 
understand the sources, capabilities, intentions, and true identities of the full range of 
Russian media manipulation. 
The final recommendation for further research is to closely compare printed 
material as presented in conventional media and archives. Research in this area is time-
intensive and often difficult to acquire, as realized during the initial phase of this study. 
Accessing key documents often requires understanding the Russian (or other non-English) 
languages, careful consideration of the researcher’s media acquirement, and understanding 
of their public release methods inside and outside their country. Historically, Russia 
[former Soviet Union] has released much of its propaganda in non-U.S. countries, so that 
the media piece would be disseminated more naturally through the use of unwitting 
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individuals, which fail to recognize the use of information and narrative tailored to fit 
criteria of their cognitive and perceptual bias.248  
In closing thoughts, this research represents only a small portion of what could be 
a larger Russian Federation influence operation for achieving nuclear security strategy 
objectives. If Russia is using strategic deception with social media to boast their strategic 
weapons program, is their effort significantly impacting U.S. and allies’ decision-making? 
Certainly, history illustrates the USSR and Russia’s use of media to advantage and it would 
be no surprise to see more active measures intended to advance the political value of 
Moscow’s nuclear arsenal. The Status-6 and INF Treaty Twitter Network is a small piece 
of a looming puzzle. Understanding the pieces and purpose of that puzzle could help the 
United States to counter Russia’s nuclear game of maskirovka and win the ongoing battle 
of the narrative about nuclear security and stability. 
                                                 
248 “Soviet Active Measures in the Era of Glasnost: A Report to Congress by The United States 
Information Agency,” Inside the Cold War, 1988, http://insidethecoldwar.org/sites/default/files/documents/
Soviet%20Active%20Measures%20in%20the%20Era%20of%20Glasnot%20March%201988.pdf. p 71. 
82 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
83 
LIST OF REFERENCES 
@DFRLab. “#TrollTracker: From Tags to Trolling, How Tweets to a Small Group 
Precede Attacks on Critics of the Syrian and Russian Regimes.” Medium. June 
27, 2018. https://medium.com/dfrlab/trolltracker-from-tags-to-trolling-
58bb2ef87acd. 
Adamsky, Dmitry (Dima). “Cross-Domain Coercion: The Current Russian Art of 
Strategy.” (Paris: Institut Français des Relations Internationales, Proliferation 
Papers No. 54, 2015). http://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/
pp54adamsky.pdf. 
AP News. “Putin Coy about Extending His Rule in Russia beyond 2024,” June 5, 2018. 
https://apnews.com/ce86968b65094649ab1950608b5980d0 (November 10, 2019). 
Arms Control Association. “The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty at a 
Glance.” August 2019. https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/INFtreaty. 
Arquilla, John. “Cyber War Is Already Upon Us.” Foreign Policy. February 27, 2012. 
https://foreignpolicy.com/2012/02/27/cyberwar-is-already-upon-us/. 
Arquilla, John. The Reagan Imprint: Ideas in American Foreign Policy from the Collapse 
of Communism to the War on Terror. Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2006. 
Arquilla, John, and David F. Ronfeldt. “The Advent of Netwar (Revisited)” In Networks 
and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy, edited by John 
Arquilla and David F. Ronfeldt. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001. 
Arquilla, John, and David Ronfeldt. Cyberwar Is Coming! RP-223. Santa Monica, CA: 
RAND, 1993. https://www.rand.org/pubs/reprints/RP223.html. 
Art, Robert J. “To What Ends Military Power?” International Security 4, no. 4 (Spring 
1980): 3–35. https://www.jstor.org/stable/2626666. 
Baym, Nancy K. Personal Connections in the Digital Age. 2nd ed. Malden, MA: Polity 
Press, 2015. 
Becker, Rachel. “CDC Confirms That Hawaii’s False Missile Alarm Was Scary.” The 
Verge, February 21, 2019. https://www.theverge.com/2019/2/21/18234901/cdc-
hawaii-false-missile-alarm-reactions. 
Bergstrom, Carl T. and Joseph B. Bak-Coleman. “Information Gerrymandering in Social 
Networks Skews Collective Decision-Making.” Nature 573 (September 2019): 
40–41. http://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-019-02562-z. 
84 
Bershidsky, Leonid. “Putin Is Running Out of Options to Extend His Power.” 
Bloomberg, July 24, 2019. https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-07-
24/vladimir-putin-is-running-out-of-options-to-stay-in-power (November 10, 
2019). 
Bronfenbrenner, Urie. “The Mirror Image in Soviet-American Relations: A Social 
Psychologist’s Report.” Journal of Social Issues 17, no. 3 (April 14, 2010): 45–
56. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-4560.1961.tb01682.x. 
Bryner, Jeanna. “Hawaii’s False Missile Alert Shows Americans Have No Idea What to 
Do in Nuclear Attack,” Live Science, accessed August 4, 2019, 
https://www.livescience.com/64828-false-nuclear-missile-alert-not-prepared.html. 
Byerly, Carolyn M. and Karen Ross. Women and Media: A Critical Introduction Malden, 
MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2006. 
Chorley, Martin J., Gualtiero B. Colombo, Stuart M. Allen, and Roger M. Whitaker. 
“Human Content Filtering in Twitter: the Influence of Metadata.” International 
Journal of Human-Computer Studies 74 (February 2015): 32–40. https://doi.org/
10.1016/j.ijhcs.2014.10.001. 
Cialdini, Robert B. Influence: The Psychology of Persuasion. Revised ed. New York: 
William Morrow and Company, 1991.  
Cialdini, Robert B. Pre-Suasion: A Revolutionary Way to Influence and Persuade. New 
York: Simon & Schuster, 2016. Kindle.  
Council on Foreign Relations. “Apt 28.” Accessed October 21, 2019. 
https://www.cfr.org/interactive/cyber-operations/apt-28. 
Council on Foreign Relations. “U.S.-Russia Nuclear Arms Control.” Accessed April 16, 
2019. https://www.cfr.org/timeline/us-russia-nuclear-arms-control. 
Crerar, Pippa, Jon Henley, and Patrick Wintour. “Russia Accused of Cyber-Attack on 
Chemical Weapons Watchdog.” The Guardian. October 4, 2018. 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/oct/04/netherlands-halted-russian-
cyber-attack-on-chemical-weapons-body. 
Cull, Nicholas, Vasily Gatov, Peter Pomerantsev, Anne Applebaum and Alistair 
Shawcross. Soviet Subversion, Disinformation and Propaganda: How the West 
Fought Against It: An Analytic History, with Lessons for the Present. London 




Cunningham, Daniel, Sean Everton, & Philip Murphy. Understanding Dark Networks: A 
Strategic Framework for the Use of Social Network Analysis. Lanham, MD: 
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2016. Kindle. 
Defense One. “Russia May Put Androids in Orbit Next Year, State Media Says.” 
Accessed January 22, 2019. https://www.defenseone.com/technology/2018/07/
russia-may-put-androids-orbit-next-year-state-media-says/149927/.  
Dorough-Lewis, James. “Exploring Identity and Negotiation among Women Military 
Interrogators through Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis.” PhD diss., 
Nova Southeastern University, 2017. https://nsuworks.nova.edu/shss_dcar_etd/55. 
Doshi, Vidhi, and Annie Gowen. March 28, 2018. “Whistleblower Claims Cambridge 




0084a1666987_story.html (November 22, 2018). 
Dunbar, R. I. M., Valerio Arnaboldi, Marco Conti, and Andrea Passarella. “The Structure 
of Online Social Networks Mirrors Those in the Offline World.” Social Networks 
43 (October 2015): 39–47. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socnet.2015.04.005. 
Edwards, Gemma. Social Movements and Protest. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2014. 
Ellick, Adam B., Adam Westbrook, and Jonah Kessel. 2018. “Operation Infektion: Meet 
the KGB Spies Who Invented Fake News - Video - NYTimes.Com.” New York 
Times. https://www.nytimes.com/video/opinion/100000006210828/russia-
disinformation-fake-news.html (January 21, 2019). 
Field, Anjalie, Doron Kliger, Shuly Wintner, Jennifer Pan, Dan Jurafsky, and Yulia 
Tsvetkov. “Framing and Agenda-Setting in Russian News: A Computational 
Analysis of Intricate Political Strategies.” In Proceedings of the 2018 Conference 
on Empirical Methods in Natural Language Processing D18-1393 (Brussels, 
October-November 2018): 3570–80. https://doi.org/10.18653/v1/D18-1393. 
Fiske, Susan T. 1987. “People’s Reactions to Nuclear War: Implications for 
Psychologists.” American Psychologist 42, no. 3 (1982): 207–17. https://doi.org/
10.1037/0003-066X.42.3.207.  
Free Donbas. “Novorossiya Wishes Merry Christmas and Promises to Destroy the 
World.” YouTube, January 3, 2015. Video, 0:57. https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=PpcRgutKb3U. 
Freedom House. “Russia Profile.” April 27, 2017. https://freedomhouse.org/report/
freedom-press/2017/russia. 
86 
Galeotti, Mark. “The Kremlin’s Newest Hybrid Warfare Asset: Gangsters.” Foreign 
Policy, 2017. https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/06/12/how-the-world-of-spies-
became-a-gangsters-paradise-russia-cyberattack-hack/ (September 5, 2018). 
Galeotti, Mark. The Vory: Russia’s Super Mafia. New Haven and London: Yale 
University Press, 2018. Kindle. 
Gamson, William A. The Strategy of Social Protest. 2nd ed. Belmont, Calif: Wadsworth 
Pub, 1990. 
Gamson, William A. and Andre Modigliani. “Media Discourse and Public Opinion on 
Nuclear Power: A Constructionist Approach.” American Journal of Sociology 95, 
no. 1 (July 1989): 1–37, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2780405. 
Gamson, William A., and David Stuart. “Media Discourse as a Symbolic Contest: The 
Bomb in Political Cartoons.” Sociological Forum 7, no. 1 (March 1992): 55–86. 
https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01124756. 
García, Miguel del Fresno, Alan J. Daly, and Sagrario Segado Sánchez-Cabezudo. 
“Identifying the New Influencers in the Internet Era: Social Media and Social 
Network Analysis.” Revista Española de Investigaciones Sociológicas, 153 
(2016): 23–40. http://dx.doi.org/10.5477/cis/reis.153.23. 
Gertz, Bill. “Russia Building Nuclear-Armed Drone Submarine.” Washington Free 
Beacon, September 8, 2015. https://freebeacon.com/national-security/russia-
building-nuclear-armed-drone-submarine/ (November 21, 2018). 
Ghosh, Dipayan and Ben Scott. “Digital Deceit: The Technologies behind Precision 
Propaganda on the Internet.” New America. January 3, 2018. 
https://www.newamerica.org/public-interest-technology/policy-papers/
digitaldeceit/. 
Gil de Zúñiga, Homero, Nakwon Jung, and Sebastián Valenzuela. “Social Media Use for 
News and Individuals’ Social Capital, Civic Engagement and Political 
Participation.” Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication 17, no. 3 (April 
2012): 319–36. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1083-6101.2012.01574.x. 
Gilboa, Eytan E., Maria Gabrielsen Jumbert, Jason Miklian, and Piers Robinson. 
“Moving Media and Conflict Studies beyond the CNN Effect.” Review of 
International Studies 42, no. 4 (October 2016): 654–72. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/
S026021051600005X. 
Gilboa, Eytan. “The CNN Effect: The Search for a Communication Theory of 
International Relations.” Political Communication 22, no. 1 (2005): 27–44. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/10584600590908429. 
87 
Global Zero. “A World Without Nuclear Weapons.” Accessed February 18, 2019. 
https://www.globalzero.org/.  
GlobalSecurity.org. “Status-6 / Kanyon - Ocean Multipurpose System - Russian and 
Soviet Nuclear Forces.” Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), 
https://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/russia/status-6.htm (November 21, 
2018). 
GlobalSecurity.org. “Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD): 9M729 - SSC-X-8.” 
Accessed June 13, 2019. https://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/russia/ssc-
8.htm. 
Goldstone, Jack A. “The Weakness of Organization: A New Look at Gamson’s The 
Strategy of Social Protest.” American Journal of Sociology 85, no. 5 (March 
1980): 1017–42. https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/227123. 
Gordon, Cynthia. “Chapter 15: Framing and Positioning.” In The Handbook of Discourse 
Analysis, edited by Deborah Tannen, Heidi Ehernberger Hamilton, and Deborah 
Schiffrin. 2nd ed. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2015. 
Greenwood, Shannon, Andrew Perrin, and Maeve Duggan. “Social Media Update 2016.” 
PEW Research Center. November 11, 2016. https://www.pewinternet.org/2016/
11/11/social-media-update-2016/. 
Helmus, Todd C., Elizabeth Bodine-Baron, Andrew Radin, Madeline Magnuson, Joshua 
Mendelsohn, William Marcellino, Andriy Bega, and Zen Winkelman. Russian 
Social Media Influence: Understanding Russian Propaganda in Eastern Europe. 
RR-2237-OSD. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2018. https://doi.org/10.7249/
RR2237. 
Herbers, John. “Widespread Vote Urges Nuclear Freeze.” New York Times. November 4, 
1982. https://www.nytimes.com/1982/11/04/us/widespread-vote-urges-nuclear-
freeze.html. 
Higgins, Andrew. 2017. “Maybe Private Russian Hackers Meddled in Election, Putin 
Says.” New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/01/world/europe/
vladimir-putin-donald-trump-hacking.html?smid=tw-share (September 5, 2018). 
Jane’s 360. “Russia Upgrades Kalibr Cruise Missiles.” September 25, 2019. 
https://www.janes.com/article/91514/russia-upgrades-kalibr-cruise-missiles. 
Jones, Christopher D. “Soviet Military Doctrine as Strategic Deception: An Offensive 
Military Strategy for Defense of the Socialist Fatherland.” The Journal of Slavic 
Military Studies 16, no. 3 (2003): 24–65. http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/
10.1080/13518040308430567. 
88 
Jones, Nate. 2013. “The 1983 War Scare: ‘The Last Paroxysm’ of the Cold War Part I.” 
National Security Archives. May 16, 2013. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/
NSAEBB426/. 
Kitschelt, Herbert P. “Political Opportunity Structures and Political Protest: Anti-Nuclear 
Movements in Four Democracies.” British Journal of Political Science 16, no. 1 
(January 1986): 57–85. https://www.jstor.org/stable/193981. 
Kleidman, Robert. Organizing for Peace: Neutrality, the Test Ban, and the Freeze. 
Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1993. 
Knight Foundation. “Disinformation, ‘Fake News’ and Influence Campaigns on Twitter.” 
October 4, 2018. https://knightfoundation.org/reports/disinformation-fake-news-
and-influence-campaigns-on-twitter. 
Knopf, Jeffrey W. Domestic Society and International Cooperation: The Impact of 
Protest on U.S. Arms Control Policy. New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1998. 
Kramer, Andrew E. and Megan Specia. “What Is the I.N.F. Treaty and Why Does It 
Matter?” New York Times. February 2, 2019. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/
01/world/europe/inf-treaty.html. 
Kühn, Ulrich. 2018. “Preventing Escalation in the Baltics: A NATO Playbook.” Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, May. CarnegieEndowment.org/pubs.  
Lepsky, Vladimir E. “Refleksivnoe upravlenie v polisubektnikh i mnogoagentnikh 
sistemakh (Reflexive Control in Multi-Object and Multi-Agent Systems).” 
Manuscript presented to the Timothy Thomas by Dr. Lepsky. 
Lewis, Jeffrey. “Putin’s Doomsday Machine.” Foreign Policy. Accessed October 25, 
2018. https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/11/12/putins-doomsday-machine-nuclear-
weapon-us-  
Livingston, Steven. “Diplomacy in the New Information Environment.” Georgetown 
Journal of International Affairs 4, no. 2 (Summer/Fall 2003): 111–117. 
https://www.jstor.org/stable/43133532. 
Lowenthal, Mark M. Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy. New York: SAGE 
Publications, 2006. Kindle. 
Mack, John E. “The Perception of U.S.-Soviet Intentions and Other Psychological 
Dimensions of the Nuclear Arms Race.” The American Journal of 
Orthopsychiatry 52 (October 1982). https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1939-
0025.1982.tb01448.x. 
89 
Malik, Momin M. and Jürgen Pfeffer. “A Macroscopic Analysis of News Content in 
Twitter.” Digital Journalism 4, no. 8 (February 2016): 955–79. https://doi.org/
10.1080/21670811.2015.1133249. 
Maloney, Suzanne and Keian Razipour. “The Iranian Revolution—A Timeline of 
Events.” Brookings. January 24, 2019. https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-
from-chaos/2019/01/24/the-iranian-revolution-a-timeline-of-events/. 
Manjoo, Farhad. “Tackling the Internet’s Central Villain: The Advertising Business; 
State of the Art.” New York Times. January 31, 2018 Wednesday. https://advance-
lexis-com.libproxy.nps.edu/api/document?collection=news&id=urn: 
contentItem:5RJ7-X471-DXY4-X54B-00000-00&context=1516831. 
McCarthy, John & Zald, Mayer. (2007). The Trend of Social Movements in America: 
Professionalization and Resource Mobilization. https://www.researchgate.net/
publication/30851684_The_Trend_of_Social_Movements_in_America_
Professionalization_and_Resource_Mobilization (September 30, 2019). 
McGuinness, Damien. “How a Cyber Attack Transformed Estonia.” BBC. September 5, 
2018. https://www.bbc.com/news/39655415. 
Mihalka, Michael. “Soviet Strategic Deception, 1955–1981.” Journal of Strategic Studies 
5, no. 1 (1982): 40–93. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402398208437102. 
Mizokami, Kyle. “Kalashnikov Will Make an A.I.-Powered Killer Robot.” Popular 
Mechanics. July 19, 2017. https://www.popularmechanics.com/military/weapons/
news/a27393/kalashnikov-to-make-ai-directed-machine-guns/. 
Mueller, Robert S., III. Report on the Investigation into Russian Interference in the 2016 
Presidential Election Volume I of II. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of 
Justice, March 2019). https://www.justice.gov/storage/report.pdf. 
Newman, M. E. J. “Equivalence between Modularity Optimization and Maximum 
Likelihood Methods for Community Detection.” Physical Review E 94, no. 5 
(November 2016): 1–8. https://link.aps.org/doi/10.1103/PhysRevE.94.052315. 
Newman, M. E. J. and M. Girvan. “Finding and Evaluating Community Structure in 
Networks.” Physical Review E 69, no. 2 (February 2004): 1–15. 
https://link.aps.org/doi/10.1103/PhysRevE.69.026113. 
Nuclear Threat Initiative. “Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics on Strategic Offensive Reductions (START I).” 




Oates, Sarah. “Russian Media in the Digital Age: Propaganda Rewired.” Russian Politics 
1, no. 4 (December 30, 2016): 398–417. https://doi.org/10.1163/2451-8921-
00104004.  
Oberdorfer, Don. From the Cold War to a New Era: The United States and the Soviet 
Union, 1983–1991. Updated ed. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1998. 
Office of the Historian. “1981–1988: The Presidency of Ronald W. Reagan.” Accessed 
April 20, 2019. https://history.state.gov/milestones/1981-1988/foreword. 
Office of the Historian. “The Angola Crisis 1974–75.” Accessed April 20, 2019. 
https://history.state.gov/milestones/1969-1976/angola. 
Office of the Historian. “Buried in the Sands of the Ogaden: The Horn of Africa and 
SALT II, 1977–1979.” Accessed April 20, 2019. https://history.state.gov/
milestones/1977-1980/horn-of-africa. 
Office of the Historian. “Ending the Vietnam War, 1969–1973.” Accessed April 20, 
2019. https://history.state.gov/milestones/1969-1976/ending-vietnam. 
Office of the Historian. “Milestones: 1969–1976.” Accessed April 20, 2019. 
https://history.state.gov/milestones/1969-1976/ending-vietnam. 
Open Source Center. “Russia -- Source Descriptors of Key Russian Media.” December 6, 
2007. https://fas.org/irp/dni/osc/russian-media.pdf. 
Orlando Sentinel. “Political Cartoons: Ronald Reagan.” Accessed April 20, 2019. 
https://www.orlandosentinel.com/politics/os-reagan-editorial-cartoons-dana-
summers-20120911-photogallery.html. 
Paul, Christopher and Miriam Matthews. The Russian “Firehose of Falsehood” 
Propaganda Model: Why It Might Work and Options to Counter It. PE-198-OSD. 
Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2018. https://doi.org/10.7249/PE198. 
Pew Research Center. “Demographics of Social Media Users in 2016.” November 11, 
2016. https://www.pewinternet.org/2016/11/11/social-media-update-2016/. 
Pew Research Center. “Public Sees a Future Full of Promise and Peril.” June 22, 2010. 
https://www.pewresearch.org/2010/06/22/public-sees-a-future-full-of-promise-
and-peril/. 




Pringle, Robert W. “Putin: The New Andropov?” International Journal of Intelligence 
and CounterIntelligence 14, no. 4 (2001): 545–58. https://doi.org/10.1080/
08850600152617155. 
Räbiger, Stefan and Myra Spiliopoulou. “A Framework for Validating the Merit of 
Properties that Predict the Influence of a Twitter User.” Expert Systems with 
Applications 42, no. 5 (April 2015): 2824–2834. https://doi.org/10.1016/
j.eswa.2014.11.006. 
Reese, Stephen D. “Prologue- Framing public life: A bridging model for media research.” 
In Framing Public Life: Perspectives on Media and Our Understanding of the 
Social World, edited by Stephen D. Reese, Oscar H. Gandy, Jr., and August E. 
Grant. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc., Publishers, 2001.  
Reuters. “Putin, before Vote, Says He’d Reverse Soviet Collapse If He Could: Agencies.” 
August 30, 2018. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-election-putin/putin-
before-vote-says-hed-reverse-soviet-collapse-if-he-could-agencies-
idUSKCN1GE2TF. 
Reuters. “Timeline: Vladimir Putin’s 8 Years as Russian President.” February 28, 2018. 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-election-putin/timeline-vladimir-putins-
8-years-as-russian-president-idUSL2890991520080228. 
Riquelme, Fabián and Pablo González-Cantergiani. “Measuring User Influence on 
Twitter: A Survey.” Information Processing & Management 52, no. 5 (August 
2015): 949–75. http://arxiv.org/abs/1508.07951. 
Roblin, Sebastien. “We Now Know Why Russia Wants a 100-Megaton Nuclear 
Torpedo.” The National Interest. March 2, 2018. https://nationalinterest.org/blog/
the-buzz/we-now-know-why-russia-wants-100-megaton-nuclear-torpedo-24736. 
Romerstein, Herbert. The World Peace Council and Soviet “Active Measures.” The Hale 
Foundation. CIA-RDP90-00806R0002007200005-5. Unpublished part of a larger 
study to be accomplished by the National Strategy Information Center in 1983, 
marked as approved for release on June 15, 2010. https://www.cia.gov/library/
readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP90-00806R000200720005-5.pdf. 
Roper Center for Public Opinion Research. “Public Opinion about Using Nuclear 
Weapons.” Accessed August 4, 2019. https://ropercenter.cornell.edu/blog/public-
opinion-about-using-nuclear-weapons. 
Rosenberg, Matthew, Mike McIntire, Michael LaForgia, Andrew Kramer, and Elizabeth 
Dias. 2018. “Beyond the N.R.A.: Maria Butina’s Peculiar Bid for Russian 
Influence.” New York Times, August 4, 2018. 
Roth-Ey, Kristin. Moscow Prime Time: How the Soviet Union Built the Media Empire 
That Lost the Cultural Cold War. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2014. 
92 
Sakwa, Richard. “Conspiracy Narratives as a Mode of Engagement in International 
Politics: The Case of the 2008 Russo-Georgian War.” Russian Review 71 no. 4 
(October 2012): 581–609. http://www.jstor.org/stable/23263931. 
Salter, Charles A. “Psychological Effects of Nuclear and Radiological Warfare.” Military 
Medicine 166, supp. 2 (December 2001): 17–18. https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/
pubmed/11778420. 
Schelling, Thomas C. “An Astonishing Sixty Years: The Legacy of Hiroshima.” Prize 
Lecture. Beijersalen, The Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences, Stockholm, 
December 8, 2005. https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/economic-sciences/2005/
schelling/lecture/. 
Scheufele, D. A. “Framing as a Theory of Media Effects.” Journal of Communication 
49(1): 103–22. (February 7, 2006) (July 30, 2019): http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/
doi/abs/10.1111/j.1460-2466.1999.tb02784.x. 
Shane, Scott. Dismantling Utopia: How Information Ended the Soviet Union. 1st 
Elephant paperback ed. Chicago: I.R. Dee, 1995.  
Shoemaker, Pamela J. and Stephen D. Reese. Mediating the Message: Theories of 
Influence in Mass Media Content. 2nd ed. White Plains, NY: Longman 
Publishers, 1996. 
Snyder, Alvin A. Warriors of Disinformation: How Lies, Videotape, and the USIA Won 
the Cold War. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2012. 
Sputnik. “Russian Underwater Drone Poseidon Keeps U.S. Intel on the Alert.” March 26, 
2019. https://sputniknews.com/science/201903261073561919-udnerwater-drone-
poseidon-intelligence-us/. 
Stanford University. “Hubs and Authorities.” August 14, 2019. https://nlp.stanford.edu/
IR-book/html/htmledition/hubs-and-authorities-1.html. 
Steinert-Threlkeld, Zachary C. Twitter as Data. 1st ed. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2018. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108529327. 
Stengel, Richard. 2007. “Person of the Year 2007, Choosing Order Over Freedom.” Time. 
December 19, 2007. http://content.time.com/time/specials/2007/personoftheyear/
article/0,28804,1690753_1690757,00.html. 
Stewart, Alexander J., Mohsen Mosleh, Marina Diakonova, Antonio A. Arechar, David 
D. Rand, and Joshua B. Plotkin. “Information Gerrymandering and Undemocratic 
Decisions.” Nature 573 (September 2019): 117–21. https://www.nature.com/
articles/s41586-019-1507-6. 
93 
StopFake.org. “Russia Demonstrates Missile Claiming No Violation of INF – Only to 
Prove Opposite.” January 29, 2019. https://www.stopfake.org/en/russia-
demonstrates-missile-claiming-no-violation-of-inf-only-to-prove-opposite/. 
Tarrow, Sidney, and Charles Tilly. “Contentious Politics and Social Movements” in The 
Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics. eds. Carles Boix and Susan C. Stokes. 
Oxford University Press. http://oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/
9780199566020.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199566020-e-19. 
TASS. “Poseidon Underwater Drone Trials Confirm Its Speed, Unlimited Range.” 
February 5, 2019. https://tass.com/defense/1043379. 
TASS. “Russia Lays Groundwork for Self-Learning Artificial Intelligence Weapons - 
Military & Defense.” June 6, 2018. https://tass.com/defense/1008270. 
The Hindu. “Existence of Russian Doomsday Torpedo Confirmed.” January 18, 2018. 
https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/existence-of-russian-doomsday-
torpedo-confirmed/article22465526.ece. 
Thomas, Timothy L. “Dialectical versus Empirical Thinking: Ten Key Elements of the 
Russian Understanding of Information Operations.” The Journal of Slavic 
Military Studies 11, no. 1 (December 2007): 40–62. https://doi.org/10.1080/
13518049808430328. 
Thomas, Timothy L. “Russia’s Reflexive Control Theory and the Military.” The Journal 
of Slavic Military Studies 17, no. 2 (2004): 237–56. https://doi.org/10.1080/
13518040490450529. 
Thompson, James A. Psychological Aspects of Nuclear War. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley 
and Sons, 1985.  
Tsypkin, Mikhail. “Russia, America and Missile Defense.” Defense & Security Analysis 
28, no. 1 (March 1, 2012): 55–64. https://doi.org/10.1080/14751798.2012.651379. 
Tuchman, Gaye and Barbara Tuchman. Making News: A Study in the Construction of 
Reality. New York: Free Press, 1978. 
TV Zvezda. “Минобороны Предъявило Доказательства Отсутствия Нарушений 
ДРСМД Со Стороны РФ” (The Ministry of Defense Presented Evidence of the 
absence of violations of the INF Treaty by the Russian Federation). Accessed 
August 2, 2019, https://tvzvezda.ru/news/forces/content/2019123126-DiO1a.html. 
Twitter. “Enabling Further Research of Information Operations on Twitter.” Accessed 
November 1, 2019. https://blog.twitter.com/en_us/topics/company/2018/enabling-
further-research-of-information-operations-on-twitter.html. 
94 
Twitter. “Updating Our Advertising Policies on State Media.” Accessed November 1, 
2019. https://blog.twitter.com/en_us/topics/company/2019/
advertising_policies_on_state_media.html. 
Tzu, Sun. The Art of War. Translated by Samuel B. Griffith. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1971.  
U.S. Department of Defense. “Mattis Sees No Change in Russian Military Capability in 
Light of Putin.” Accessed October 31, 2019. https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/
News/Article/Article/1463160/mattis-sees-no-change-in-russian-military-
capability-in-light-of-putins-speech/. 
U.S. Department of Defense. Nuclear Posture Review February 2018. Arlington, VA: 
Department of Defense, February 2018. https://media.defense.gov/2018/Feb/02/
2001872886/-1/-1/1/2018-NUCLEAR-POSTURE-REVIEW-FINAL-
REPORT.PDF. 
U.S. Department of State. “Treaty between The United States of America and The Union 
of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of their Intermediate-range and 
Shorter-range Missiles (INF Treaty).” Conclusion date: December 8, 1987. 
https://2009-2017.state.gov/t/avc/trty/102360.htm 
U.S. House of Representatives. “Threats to United States Security in the Post-Cold War 
Era,” Hearing Before the Committee on Government Reform, House Of 
Representatives, One Hundred Sixth Congress Second Session. January 24, 2000. 
Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/
pkg/CHRG-106hhrg66968/pdf/CHRG-106hhrg66968.pdf. 1–130. 
United States Information Agency. Soviet Active Measures in the Era of Glasnost: A 
Report to Congress by the United States Information Agency. Washington, DC: 




V.V. Kadetov, Colonel. “The Employment of Special Task Forces Under Contemporary 
Conditions,” Military Thought, Military Theoretical Journal. July-August 1995. 
Ven Bruusgaard, Kristin. “Russian Strategic Deterrence.” Survival 58, no. 4 (2016): 7–
26. https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2016.1207945. 
Weisburd, Andrew, Clint Watts, and JM Berger. “Trolling for Trump: How Russia Is 




Wittner, Lawrence S. “Nuclear Freeze and Its Impact.” Arms Control Association. 
Accessed January 6, 2019. https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2010_12/
LookingBack. 
Wittner, Lawrence S. “The Nuclear Freeze and Its Impact.” Arms Control Association. 
Accessed January 6, 2019. https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2010_12/
LookingBack. 
Woolf, Amy F. Russia’s Nuclear Weapons: Doctrine, Forces, and Modernization. CRS 
Report No. R45861. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, August 5, 
2019. https://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R45861.pdf. 
Yablokov, Ilya. “Conspiracy Theories as a Russian Public Diplomacy Tool: The Case of 
Russia Today (RT).” Politics 35, no. 3–4 (2015): 301–15, https://doi.org/10.1111/
1467-9256.12097. 
Young, Kevin L. and Charli Carpenter. “Does Science Fiction Affect Political Fact? Yes 
and No: A Survey Experiment on ‘Killer Robots.’” International Studies 
Quarterly 62, no. 3 (August 2018): 562–76. https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqy028. 
Zasurskiĭ, Ivan. Media and Power in Post-Soviet Russia. Armonk, N.Y: M.E. Sharpe, 
2004. 
Ziegler, Charles A. “Intelligence Assessments of Soviet Atomic Capability, 1945–1949: 
Myths, Monopolies and Maskirovka.” Intelligence and National Security 12, no. 4 
(1997): 1–24. http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/02684529708432446. 
96 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
97 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
 Ft. Belvoir, Virginia 
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
 Naval Postgraduate School 
 Monterey, California 
